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ABSTRACT
The thesis aims to highlight the background o f present Turkish-Israeli 
relations and revealing the historical roots o f Turkish-Israeli relations within the 
context o f the Middle East. Turkish Israeli relations are analyzed mainly within the 
framework o f the period between 1948 establishment o f the State o f Israel and 1980 
reducing Turkish representation level in Israel. This study gives a chronological 
account of the relations and analyzes them in four phases; firstly, the historical 
background o f Turkish-Jewish relations; secondly the period o f the establishment of 
Israel and its impact on the relations with the U S., Middle East States and Turkey; 
thirdly Turkish-Israeli relations after the establishment o f Israel mainly from 1950 up 
to 1960; and fourthly Turkish-Israeli relations from the 1960s up to 1980s are 
examined. As international incidents and relations are interdependent, Turkish-Israeli 
bilateral relations are examined by analyzing the main international incidents in the 
specified period. The relations with the Arab States and dominant powers in the 
Middle East are briefly explained and a brief summary o f  today’s relations is also 
included to the study.
Ill
ÖZET
Bu tez, bugünkü Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin geçmişini ve Orta Doğu 
çerçevesinde Türkiye İsrail ilişkilerinin tarihi temellerini ortaya koymak amacıyla 
hazırlanmıştır. Tezde Türkiye İsrail ilişkileri, İsrail devletinin kuruluş tarihi olan 
1948 ve İsrail’deki Türkiye temsilciliğinin derecesinin düşürüldüğü 1980 tarihleri 
arasındaki dönem çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma ilişkilerin kronolojik 
sıralamaya göre dökümünü vererek, ilişkileri dört bölümde incelemektedir. Birinci 
bölümde Türk Yahudi ilişkilerinin tarihçesi verilmekte; ikinci bölümde İsrail 
devletinin kuruluşu, ve A B.D., Orta Doğu devletleri ve Türkiye üzerindeki tesirleri 
ve ilişkileri ele alınmaktadır. Üçüncü bölümde ise; İsrail’in kuruluşundan sonraki 
1950 ile 1960 yıllan arasındaki Türkiye İsrail ilişkileri incelenmiştir. Dördüncü 
bölümde ise 1960-1980 dönemindeki Türkiye İsrail ilişkileri ele alınmıştır. 
Uluslararası olaylar ve ilişkiler birbirleri ile bağlantılı olduklan için Türkiye İsrail 
ikili ilişkileri, söz konusu belirli zaman dilimindeki başlıca uluslararası olaylar ele 
alınarak incelenmiştir. Bu çalışmada, Arap ülkeleri ile ilişkiler ve Orta Doğu’daki 
egemen güçler kısaca açıklanmış ve bugünkü ilişkilere de çok kısa olarak 
değinilmiştir.
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INTRODUCTION
In this study, the period between the establishment o f Israel on 14 May 1948 
up to 1980s, when Turkish representation level in Israel was reduced, is analyzed with 
the aim of highlighting the background o f present Turkish-Israeli relations and 
revealing the historical roots o f Turkish-Israeli relations within the context o f the 
Middle East. As international incidents and relations are interdependent, when 
analyzing specific bilateral relations, it is very difficult to isolate bilateral factors from 
multilateral relations. When the Turkish-Israeli relations are analyzed, Turkey’s 
relations with other Middle East countries and Arab-Israeli conflict, and its impacts on 
Israelis relations with the Middle East countries stand out to be the main determinant 
factors.
In the first chapter, before starting to examine the relations between Turkey 
and Israel between 1948 to 1980s, the historical background of the relations is 
examined by firstly reviewing the history o f Jews and the emergence o f the Zionist 
ideology briefly as the roots of the State of Israel goes back to Judaism and Zionism. 
Then, Turkish-Jewish relations during the Ottoman Empire period are taken into 
hand. The relations during the Turkish War o f Independence and at the period, 
between the establishment o f Turkish Republic and the Second World War are 
analyzed in order to lay out the roots o f the relations between Turkey and Israel in the 
pre-establishment period o f Israel.
In chapter two, relations after the establishment o f the state of Israel are 
analyzed. On 14 May 1948, at the end of the British Mandate in Palestine, the State o f 
Israel was established. But the establishment of a new state in Palestine gave rise to 
strong reactions fi’om the Arab and other Middle East States. In order to highlight the 
factors that led to the emergence o f a new state in the Middle East, pre-establishment 
period o f Israel is examined. After the establishment o f Israel, balance of power in the 
Middle East changed, the Arab-Israeli conflict emerged and the struggle for power 
between the U S. and the Soviet Union increased. As this thesis analyzes Turkish- 
Israeli relations between 1948-1980s, in order to be able to clearly analyze the period, 
international relations of Israel during the first years of establishment and the attitudes 
and policies o f the Middle East States, the U S. and Turkey towards Israel is 
examined in the second chapter.
In chapter three, the period between 1950 to 1960 is examined and the 
eminent determinant factors in Turkish-Israeli relations are seen as Turkish western- 
oriented foreign policy and Israel’s isolation in the Middle East, which leads Israel to 
seek an ally in the region in order to safeguard its security. The U  S. and western 
support behind Israel and pressure on Turkey were also the major factors in Turkish- 
Israeli bilateral relations. The consequences of the external pressures were the 
formation o f the Balkan Pact, the Baghdad Pact and the Peripheral Pact. The Suez 
Crisis was also an important event, which affected all the relations. These pacts, as 
well as the Suez Crisis and their impacts on Turkish-Israeli relations are reviewed in 
the third chapter.
In chapter four, Turkish-Israeli relations from 1960 up to 1980s are analyzed. 
From the end o f the Second World War up to the rise of the Cyprus conflict in the 
1960s, Turkey pursued western oriented policies. But after Turkey’s isolation by the 
major powers in the Cyprus issue, Turkey began to reconsider its foreign policy and 
make amendments. Therefore, it can be said that as a result o f the Cyprus conflict, 
Turkey began to give more priority to safeguard its national security and its interests 
like other states. In the 1960s, the Cyprus issue became the major factor in Turkish 
Foreign Policy and hence, affected Turkey’s domestic policy and international 
relations. In order to provide support for the Cyprus issue from the Middle East 
States, Turkey had to keep her relations in balance with both the Arab states and 
Israel. During this period, two Arab-Israeli wars broke up, which were, the Six-Day 
War in 1967 and Yom Kippur War in 1973. Also at the time o f the war, Turkey had 
to be especially careful in order to keep the continuance of the economic and political 
support, and maintain stability in the region. During the period between 1970s till 
1980s, changes occurred in Turkish-Israeli relations. The impacts o f the Cyprus issue, 
as well as the impacts o f the Arab-Israeli Wars o f 1967 and 1973 on Turkish-Israeli 
relations are examined. These events are observed by trying to trace their effects on 
the present developments in Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations.
CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH ISRAEL 
RELATIONS
In order to be able to clearly analyze and comprehend Turkish-Israeli relations 
and highlight the grounds o f contemporary good relations between the two countries, 
a brief review o f Jewish history before the establishment o f Israel and the account o f 
Turkish-Jewish relations during the Ottoman period with regard to the emergence of 
Zionism and British policies is necessary. According to my point o f view, this brief 
historical perspective will primarily provide another dimension to the framework of 
this study as well as exposing the roots o f present relations.
1.1. The History of Jews Before The Establishment of Israel
Some sources on Israel’s history start to study the Jewish history from the 
beginning o f Zionism. But some others prefer to study this history from the beginning 
of the 17*’’ century B.C., which is also my preference, as I believe this historical 
perspective will provide an objective approach to this study and place the survey in 
right dimensions.
As in other societies, Jewish history plays an important role in the formation 
of the Jewish identity and social psychology. Jewish identity is also affected by the 
lessons o f the Old Testament where Jews are considered as the chosen people, *
' Davutoglu, 1994: 91
Jewish history begins in the 17th Century B.C. with the prophet Abraham, his son 
Isaac and grandson Jacob at Egypt. The Book o f Genesis relates how Abraham was 
summoned from Ur o f the Caldeans to Canaan to bring people to the belief in One 
God.^ Isaac ruled after Abraham, then Jacob became the leader o f the Jews and Jews 
were named as the Israelites or the tribe o f Israel. During Jacob’s period, Jews were 
oppressed very harshly, therefore they had to migrate from Egypt to the Sinai 
Peninsula.^ They wandered 40 years in the Sinai desert, where they were forged into a 
nation and received the Torah, which consists o f the Ten Commandments and giving 
form to their monotheistic faith. According to the biblical narrative, Moses was 
chosen by God to take the Israelites from Egypt to Palestine “* in 13*-12“* centuries 
B.C. ’ Jewish Kingdom was established in Palestine in 1020 B.C., by the first king 
Saul, formed by loose tribal organizations, which turned into a full monarchy under 
the reign o f his successor, David. David’s son Solomon who succeeded him, further 
strengthened the kingdom between 965-930 B.C. After the death o f Solomon, 
insurrections broke up and he divided the country into two kingdoms as, Israel, the 
Northern Kingdom and Judah, the Southern Kingdom. *
The Kingdom of Israel, with its capital Samaria, lasted more than 200 years 
under the reign of 19 kings, while the Kingdom o f Judah was ruled from Jerusalem for 
350 years by 19 kings o f the lineage o f David. The Assyrian and Babylonian Empires 
brought first Israel and later Judah under their control. The Kingdom of Israel was 
destroyed by the Assyrians in 722 B.C. and its people were exiled. Over a hundred
 ^Facts About Israel, 1997. 10
 ^in Old Testament this event is named as; Exodus; Armaoglu, 1989:7-8.
as Jews call; the Land of Israel or Eretz Israel 
 ^Facts About Israel, 1997:10.
years later, the Babylonian Empire conquered the Kingdom o f Judah and exiled most 
of the natives and destroyed Jerusalem in 586 B .C 7 The Babylonian conquest brought 
an end to the First Jewish Commonwealth (First Temple Period) in 586 B.C. The 
exile, which followed, did not eradicate the Jewish people’s connection with Palestine. 
This event marked the beginning of the Jewish Diaspora, the spread of Jews to other 
countries. During the exile period, Judaism began to develop a religious framework 
and way o f life outside the land, which ensured people’s national survival and spiritual 
identity.* 
From 535 till 331 BC, Persia dominated Palestine and according to the book 
‘Tacts About Israel”, the period is determined as between 538-333 B.C. The Jews 
were allowed to have varying degrees o f self-rule under Persian rule, also during the 
later Hellenistic (Ptolemaic and Seleucid) overlordship (332-142 B.C.). After 539 BC 
when Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian Empire conquered the Babylonian 
Empire. Jews constructed the Second Temple on the site of the First Temple, 
refortified Jerusalem’s walls and established the Knesset Hagedolah (Great Assembly) 
as the supreme religious and judicial body o f the Jewish people, which marked the 
beginning o f the second Jewish Commonwealth (Second Temple Period). Under the 
restrictions o f the Persian Empire, Judah became a nation centered in Jerusalem 
whose leadership was entrusted to the high priest and the council of elders. ’
® Facts About Israel, 1997:10. 
 ^Armaoglu, 1989:8-9.
* Facts About Israel, 1997:13. 
’ Facts About Israel, 1997:15.
In the late 4* century BC, Judea became a province o f Alexander the Great’s 
Empire. The land remained as a Jewish theocracy under Syrian-based Seleucid 
rulers. The Seleucid rulers began a campaign to replace Judaism with Hellenism and 
Jews were prohibited from practicing Judaism and their Temple was desecrated as 
part of an effort to impose HeUenic culture and customs.*' In 166 B.C., the Jews 
revolted under the leadership o f the Jewish priest, Mattahias from the Hasmonean 
family and his son Judah the Maccabee. After a military struggle, Jewish forces 
defeated the Syrian forces. Then, the Hasmonaean dynasty or Maccabees became the 
leaders and kings o f an independent Jewish state. The Hasmonean Dynasty lasted 
about 80 years. During this period, political consolidation under Jewish rule was 
attained and Jewish civilization flourished. When the Romans replaced the Seleucids 
as the great power in the region, they granted the Hasmonean king, Hyrcanus II, 
limited authority. Under the Roman governor o f Damascus, Jews were hostile to the 
new regime and there were frequent revolts in that period (63 B.C.-313C).*^
Hasmonean rule ended in 40 B .C. and the Land became a province o f the 
Roman Empire. In 37 B.C. Herod, the Romans appointed the son-in-law o f Hyrcanus 
II, as a king o f Judea. He was granted almost unlimited autonomy in the country’s 
internal affairs. Despite his many achievements, Herod lost the trust and support of his 
Jewish subjects. Ten years after Herod’s death (4 B.C.), Judea came under direct 
Roman administration.*'* The Roman governors o f Judea were despotic and had
Glatzer, 1995: 5 
” Facts About Israel, 1997:15. 
Glatzer, 1995: 6.
Facts About Israel, 1997:15-16 
Facts About Israel, 1997:16
neither respect for the Jewish religion nor for the newly emerging Christianity.'^ In 66 
A.D., Jewish revolts broke out. By the 70 A D., the revolt was crushed by Roman 
forces under the leadership of General Vespasion and Jerusalem was razed off. This 
situation led to the Jewish diaspora. Judea was silent under the strict Roman control 
for a long time. But when Roman Emperor Hadrion rebuilt Jerusalem as a pagan city, 
a violent revolt broke out in Judea. From 132 to 135 A.D., the Jews fought against 
the Romans and were, for a while, successful. Finally the rebellion was put down by 
Rome and Judea was prostrated. By the order of the Emperor, the name of the 
province was changed into Syria Palaestina. The decree of death penalty was applied 
to any Jew who entered into the gates of this district. The fall o f Judea also created a 
greater conflict between Jews and Christians. The Jews considered the loss as a 
disaster, but the Christians considered it as a manifestation that God had abandoned 
the Jews and viewed Christians as the true bearers o f divine grace.'’
During the first three centuries o f the Christian era, Christianity spread 
increasingly. By the end o f the 4th century Constantine I, Emperor of the Byzantine 
Empire, adopted Christianity, both personally and for his empire.'* The Palestinian 
region became predominantly a Christian country and Jews were deprived o f their 
former relative autonomy as well as their right to hold public positions and were also 
forbidden to enter Jerusalem except once a year (on a day o f Tisha b ’Av-to mourn the 
destruction of the “Temple”) . B u t  these circumstances and anti-semitic policies did 
not break up the Jews. In contrast, it led to Jewish unity, which was based on religion.
15 Glatzer, 1995:7
For the meaning of the Jewish Diaspora, see p.6.
'' Glatzer, 1995:7
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Glatzer, 1995:7
Facts About Israel, 1997:19
a common language, literary heritage, a well-knit community life and organization and 
their hope of returning to Palestine.^'*
Four years after the death o f the prophet Muhammad in 632, Arabs entered 
into Palestine under the rule o f Caliph Ömer and ruled for more than four centuries 
with caliphs ruling from Damascus then from Baghdad and Egypt. During this period, 
the Jewish community was permitted to settle in Jerusalem and they protected their 
status o f non-Muslims under Islamic rule, their lives, properties and freedom o f belief 
were safeguarded, in return they had to pay land taxes. This period marked Islamic 
tolerance between Muslims and Jews. But the imposition o f heavy taxes on 
agricultural lands led many Jews to move from rural areas to towns and increasing 
social and economic discrimination forced some o f the Jews to leave the country.
In July 1099, the First Crusade army captured Jerusalem and massacred the 
city’s non-Christian inhabitants. During the next few decades, the Crusaders extended 
their power over the rest o f the country. After a while, the Crusaders opened up 
transportation routes from Europe, pilgrimages to the Holy Land became popular and 
increasing numbers o f Jews sought to return to Palestine. At that period, 300 rabbis 
from France and England arrived in a group, some o f them settled in Acre (Akko) and 
others settled in Jerusalem.
When a Muslim army overthrew the Crusaders under the rule o f Selahaddin 
Eyyubi in 1187, the Jews acquired certain measures of freedom. Although the 
Crusaders regained a foothold in the country after Selahaddin Eyyubi’s death in 1193, 
their presence was limited to a network o f fortified castles. Finally, the Crusaders’
“  Facts About Israel, 1997:8. 
Facts About Israel, 1997:19.
authority in the land ended when the Crusaders were defeated by the Mamluks, who 
had come to power in Egypt in 1291. The land, under the Mamluks was ruled from 
Damascus. By the end o f the Middle Ages, the country’s towns were ruined and 
Jerusalem was abandoned. Mamluk rule declined because of political-economic 
upheavals, plagues and devastating earthquakes.^^ In 1517, Palestine was conquered 
by the Ottomans and the land was divided into four districts which were 
administratively attached to the province of Damascus and ruled from Istanbul.
1.2. Ottoman Period
The Ottoman Turkish presence in Palestine began in 1516 and extended to the 
British mandate of Palestine in 1918. During the Ottoman period, there was Jewish 
migration to the Ottoman Empire, which also played an important role in Turkish- 
Jewish relations. Eharing the 16* century there were 1.000 Jewish families hving in the 
Ottoman Empire, mainly inhabiting in Jerusalem, Nablus (Shehem), Hebron, Gaza, 
Safed (Tzfat) and in the villages o f Galilee. The Jewish community was composed of 
the descendants o f Jews who had always lived in this land as well as immigrants from 
North Africa and Europe^'*. Thousands of Spanish Jews migrated to the western part 
of today’s Turkey in order to escape from Jewish massacres in Europe. For this 
reason, Istanbul became the dwelling place o f the largest Jewish community in Europe 
during the 16th century.
24
Facts About Israel, 1997:20. 
Facts About Israel, 1997:21. 
Facts About Israel, 1997:21.
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In the Ottoman Empire, relations between Muslims and non Muslims reflected 
broad political tolerance and policies were implemented in response to the economic 
and social needs o f the state and the general population. On the whole, Ottoman 
attitude towards the minorities was very tolerant and above all pragmatic.^® Ottoman 
Sultans paid special attention to Jerusalem, which was considered as the holy city of 
the three faiths. Ottoman policies towards non-Muslims seldom varied from one 
community to another. The most fundamental basis o f Ottoman relations with Jews 
and Christians was the Islamic one, which put these minorities into the status o f 
dhimmis Jews and Christians were considered as “people o f the book” and therefore 
their lives and properties were guaranteed. But there were some restrictions, which 
included special taxes and sumptuary regulations.^* In general the Jews enjoyed the 
tolerant rule o f the Sultans. Turks accepted Jews fleeing from the persecution o f 
Christian Europe, even before the historical action of Sultan Beyazıt II to accept the 
Jews, which were expelled from Spain in 1492.^^ The Jews who were persecuted 
elsewhere took refuge in the Middle East under Turkish rule and were granted 
residential districts in cities and towns or some privileges.^® They could settle 
anywhere they wanted and the 1914 census indicated that the population o f Palestine 
was 689. 272 people o f whom 60.000 were Jews.
1.2.1. Ottoman and Jewish Relations:
Glatzer, 1995:9.
“  Weikcr, 1996:32. 
Weiker, 1996:23. 
Weiker, 1996:130. 
’^Gruen, 1996:.112. 
Weiker, 1996:22. 
Alaöv, 1979:15.
11
It can be said that until the death o f Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent in 1566, 
Ottomans encouraged Jewish immigration. Some of them settled in Jerusalem but 
most o f them went to Safed where the Jewish population had risen to about 10.000 by 
the mid 16th Century. Over the centuries, Jews immigrated to the holy cities of 
Jerusalem, Safed, Hebron and Tiberias to pray, study and to be buried in the Holy 
Land, which was known as the Old Yishuv. The Ottoman sultans respected this 
traditional Jewish religious practices.“’  ^ Another basis o f relations with all Ottoman 
subjects, Muslims and non-Muslims, was the “millet system” under which each 
religious community was given a large amount o f autonomy to regulate its internal 
affairs. According to Ottomans, since the minorities were allowed considerable self- 
rule, they would administer their economic, social and judicial affairs as well as 
religious matters. The ability to fulfill obligations and to settle internal disputes 
without involving the government was one o f the criteria, which officials used in 
forming government policies towards millets. '^* Millet reform would also respond the 
growth o f internal turmoil within each o f the minorities under the continued 
dominance of religious authorities who were usually very conservative in their 
attitudes regarding non-religious as well as religious affairs.^*
During the 16th Century, most o f the Ottoman foreign trade was carried out 
mainly through non-Muslim intermediaries. They established the contact o f Ottoman 
Empire with European traders and a trading network with their expertise and 
knowledge of European commercial practices and capital. It was also convenient for 
Europeans, as these Ottoman agents knew the local language, customs and
Facts About Israel, 1997:22
"Gruen, 1996:.113 
Weiker, 1996:23-24.
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bureaucracy as well as other Ottoman subjects. In the 15th and 16th centuries, Jews 
monopolized the positions of brokers among the Ottoman administration and foreign 
merchants and also, with bankers and money exchangers they had the opportunity o f 
having close contacts with the foreigners.^® We can say that under the millet system of 
the Ottoman Empire, the Jewish community of Palestine enjoyed a large measure o f 
autonomy over its communal life.
In the 19th century, Palestine became the crossroads for the commerce of 
three continents, which gained more preponderance by the opening o f the Suez Canal. 
In this period, Britain, France, Russia, Austria and the US opened consulates in 
Jerusalem. Consequently, the circumstances o f Ottoman Jews gradually improved and 
their numbers increased substantially. By 1880, Jerusalem had an overall Jewish 
majority. In order to cultivate as farmers, Jews began to purchase land throughout the 
country, new rural settlements were established and the Hebrew language, which was 
restricted for a long time, revived.^* The Zionist movement, which emerged in 19* 
century aimed to unite the Jewish people o f the Diaspora (exile) and settle them in 
Palestine.
Zionism began to develop as a nationalist movement, which was modeled on 
other European ethnic and national movements in the 19th c e n tu r y .T h e  Arabs, the 
overwhelming majority o f Palestine population, opposed Zionism as well as the 
Ottoman Government opposition towards Zionist aspirations in Palestine. In 1885, 
Sultan Abdulhamit II issued an edict against aUens who were holding or acquiring real
Weiker, 1996:28-29. 
^^Weiker, 1996:29-30.
37
38
Gruen, 1996.113. 
Gruen, 1996:. 113. 
'Cohen, 1995: 1.
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estate in Palestine and against the creation o f any further Jewish colonies there. After 
November 1900, Jews coming from other places were allowed to stay in Palestine 
only for three months as pilgrims and were prevented from buying land.**' Without a 
special permit (which could be obtained from Istanbul) construction was banned. But 
while these difficulties continued, they kept on migrating. At the outbreak of the First 
World War I, the Jewish population in the land became 85.000 as compared to 5.000 
in the early 1500s. Ehiring Sultan Abdulhamid II’s period, Theador Herzl, an Austrian 
Jewish journalist, demanded permission for Jews who migrated from persecution in 
Czarist Russia and other Eastern European countries. His aim was to establish a 
Jewish Homeland in the form o f an autonomous province in Palestine. After the 
negotiations, Jews were accepted to immigrate to any district in the Ottoman Empire 
except Palestine (but they could establish settlements in Mesopotamia).'*^
In the middle o f the 19th century, the era o f Tanzimat (reform) began, wherein 
the Ottomans sought the reasons and remedies for their decline vis-à-vis Europe. One 
o f the remedies was to offer equality to the non-Muslims. As a result, as equal 
subjects o f the Empire, minorities were entitled to certain rights and certain 
obligations, such as, military service. Poll tax Oizye) was abolished, in return military 
exemption tax, in order not to do the military service was also abolished. But the 
implementation o f poll tax continued until the twentieth century.'*^
From the middle o f the 19**' Century onward, when Jews were compared with 
the Ottoman Christians (Greeks, Armenians and other populations in the Balkans), 
Jews had no political separatist ambitions and the Christian minorities were generally
'’“ Graen, 1996;. 113. 
Ataôv, 1979;. 17-20.
42 1Facts About Israel, 1997;23.
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considered as agents of the European powers which were increasingly penetrating into 
Ottoman economic and political a f f a i r s . I n  the 19th century especially, the Greek, 
Armenian and Balkan separatist movements grew. And when the Ottoman power 
declined in the Balkans, there was an increase in Christian discrimination against 
Muslims. But on the other hand, Jews remained loyal to the Ottoman state.
When the First World War broke out, Turkey was on the German side and 
Russia was an ally o f Britain. At the end o f the war, the allies imposed harsh peace 
terms on Turkey and Ottoman Christians who were strongly supported by the 
European powers sought to be included in the Lausanne Peace Treaty. The treaty 
foresaw strong guarantees for the minorities under European supervision and 
recognized many rights including a proportionate share o f government funds and 
programs'*^. The Jews shared the same ideas with the Turkish representatives in 
considering such guarantees as both unnecessary and unacceptable for Turkey’s 
sovereignty. This Jewish attitude was partly based on not being supported by any 
European powers, like the Greeks and the Armenians (who were supported by them).
1.2.2. Zionism and the Balfour Declaration
“Zionism” is the Jewish nationalist movement, which aims to create and 
support a Jewish national state in Palestine or as they call Eretz Israel (Land of
Weiker, 1996:27. 
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Israel)/*’ The movement's name is derived from Zion, the hill on which the Temple of 
Jerusalem was located and which symbolizes Jerusalem itself The idea o f Zionism is 
believed to be an inherent part o f the Jewish existence in the Diaspora through the 
centuries/** Over the centuries, the Jews o f the Diaspora associated with the hope of 
the return with the coming of the Messiah, a savior whom God would send to deliver
49them.
The Austrian Jewish philosopher Nathan Birnbaum first applied the term 
Zionism to the movement in 1890. Zionism is an organized national liberation 
movement of the Jewish people. It emerged in the late 19th century and culminated in 
1948 with the establishment o f the State o f Israel. But its roots go back to the 6th 
century BC, when the Jews were carried off to captivity in Babylon and their prophets 
encouraged them to believe that one day God would allow them to return to 
Palestine, or Eretz Israel.
Political Zionism emerged in response to the continued oppression and 
persecution o f the Jews in Eastern Europe and increasing disillusionment in Western 
Europe, which had neither put an end to discrimination nor led to the integration of 
Jews into local societies. But at the same time, in the second half o f the 19th century, 
organized anti-Semitic parties emerged in Germany and Austria-Hungary. In Russia, 
after the assassination o f Czar Alexander II in 1881, a wave o f nationalist feelings and 
anti-Jewish riots spread across the country. The 1881 movements were a turning 
point for Russian Jewry as the French Revolution had been for the French and
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1971,23:974. 
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Western European Jewry. In order to escape from persecution, large numbers of 
Russian Jews migrated to the West, primarily to the United States. A smaller number 
went to Palestine, which was then under the Ottoman rule.*®
In 1896, Theodor Herzl published a book called “The Jewish State”, in which 
he analyzed the causes o f anti-Semitism and proposed the creation of a Jewish state. 
He then demanded help for his projects from the German Emperor William II and 
Ottoman Sultan Abdiilhamid II. Neither Sultan Abdulhamid II nor the wealthy 
Ottoman Jews supported his project. When Herzl failed to obtain a charter from the 
Sultan, he directed his diplomacy towards Britain. The British offered to investigate 
the possibility o f establishing Jewish colonization in East Afiica-the so-called Uganda 
scheme, which had nearly split the Zionist movement. After HerzTs death, the 7th 
Zionist Congress convened in 1905 and rejected the East Africa scheme. Israel 
Zangwill, who formed and led the Jewish Territorial Organization, had the goal o f 
seeking a suitable territory anywhere for Jewish colonization. But the movement 
never attracted people and faded with Zangwill’s death.
Zionism found formal expression by the establishment of the Zionist 
Organization in 1897 at the First Zionist Congress, which was convened by Theodor 
Herzl in Basel, Switzerland.** The congress formulated the Basel Program, which 
remained the basic platform of the Zionist movement. The program defined Zionism's 
goal as the creation “for the Jewish people o f a home in Palestine secured by the 
public law.” The congress also founded a permanent World Zionist Organization 
(WZO) and authorized it to establish branches in every country with a substantial
' Cohen, 1995;2.
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Jewish population.*^ The Zionist movements program contained both ideological and 
practical elements that aimed to promote the return o f Jews to the Land; facilitating 
the social, cultural, economic and political revival o f Jewish national life and attaining 
an internationally recognized, legally secured home for the Jewish people in Palestine 
where Jews would be free from persecution and be able to develop their own lives and 
identity.**
In July 1922, the League o f Nations entrusted Great Britain with the mandate 
on Palestine. Recognizing “the historical coimection of the Jewish people with 
Palestine”, Great Britain was called upon to facilitate the establishment o f a Jewish 
national home in Palestine. Two months later, in September 1922, the Council o f the 
League o f Nations and Great Britain decided that the provisions for setting up a 
Jewish national home would not apply to the east of the Jordan River area, which 
constituted three fourths o f the territory included in the Mandate and eventually 
became the Hashemite Kingdom o f Jordan.
As communicated by Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour (1917), motivated by 
Zionism and encouraged by British “sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations”, waves 
of immigrants arrived in the Land between 1919 and 1939. The immigrants mainly 
settled in Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem. The immigrants were mainly from Russia 
and Poland and the last major wave o f immigration before World War II took place in 
the 1930s following Hitler’s rise to power in Germany. During World War I, the 
British wooed the Zionists in order to secure strategic control over Palestine and to 
gain the support o f world Jewry for the Allied cause. The declaration, contained in a
F.A.lsraeI, 1997:23. 
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letter from Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour to a British Zionist leader approved 
the establishment o f a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine. As Palestine 
had passed from Turkish to British control, this provided Zionists with the charter 
they had been seeking.*“*
The British Mandate authorities granted the Jewish and the Arab 
communities the right to run their own internal affairs. Utilizing this right, the Jewish 
community, known as the yishuv, elected (1920) a self-governing body based on party 
representation, which met annually to review its activities and elected the National 
Council (Vaad Leumi) to implement its policies and programs. In 1922, a Jewish 
Agency was constituted to represent the Jewish people vis-à-vis the British 
authorities, foreign governments and international organizations.
The Jewish national revival and the community’s efforts to rebuild the country 
were strongly opposed by Arab nationalists. Attempts to reach a dialogue with the 
Arabs were unsuccessful and this polarized Zionism and Arab nationalism turned into 
a potentially explosive situation. Recognizing the opposing aims o f the two national 
movements in 1937, the British recommended the partition o f the country into two 
states; Jewish and Arab. The Jewish leadership accepted the idea of partition and 
empowered the JeAvish Agency to negotiate with the British government in an effort 
to reformulate some aspects o f the proposal. The Arabs were uncompromisingly 
against any partition plan. After a while the British government changed its Palestine 
policy in an effort to appease the Arab world on. In May1939, Britain issued a White 
Paper which imposed drastic restrictions on Jewish immigration and the beginning of 
World War II caused David Ben-Gurion, later Israel’s first prime minister to declare:
Cohen, 1995: 3.
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“We will fight the war as if there were no White Paper, and the White Paper as if 
there were no war” .*^
The White Paper o f May 1939 terminated Britain's commitment to Zionism 
and provided the establishment o f a Palestinian state within ten years. The Arab 
majority in Palestine was guaranteed by a clause that provided for the fiirther 
immigration o f 75,000 Jews during the following five years, after which additional 
entry would depend on the Arab consent. The White Paper broke the traditional 
Anglo-Zionist alliance and provoked a violent protest. In May 1942, Zionist leaders 
met in New York City and demanded a Jewish Democratic Commonwealth which is 
believed to be a state in all o f western Palestine as part o f the new world order after 
the war. This “Biltmore program” marked a radical departure in Zionist policy.
During the period o f the British mandate (1920-48), the Yishuv grew from 
50,000 to 600,000 people. Most of the new immigrants were refugees from Nazi 
persecution in Europe. In 1935, a revisionist group led by Ze'ev Vladimir Jabotinsky 
seceded from the Zionist movement and formed the New Zionist party. During the 
late 1930s, Jabotinsky, who advocated a Jewish state on both sides o f the Jordan 
River, devoted himself to fiuitless arrangements for the mass evacuation o f European 
Jews to Palestine. On the other hand, coexistence with the Arabs o f Palestine became 
an increasingly intractable problem. Recurrent riots in the 1920s culminated in fiill- 
scale rebellion from 1936 to 1939. The Zionist movement adopted various 
approaches, including that o f Judah L.Magnes, president o f the Hebrew University, 
who advocated the foundation o f a joint Arab-Jewish state, and that of future Israeli
' F.AIsrael, 1997:28.
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prime minister David Ben-Gurion, who argued that accommodation with the Arabs 
could come only from a position of Jewish strength, after the Yishuv had become a 
majority.^®
The Holocaust, “the systematic murder of European Jews by the Nazis”, 
finally convinced Western Jewry of the need for a Jewish state. In 1944, the Irgun 
Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization), a Zionist guerrilla force led by the future 
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin began an armed revolt against British rule in 
Palestine. On 14 May 1948, the British mandate over Palestine ended and the Jews 
declared their independence in the new state o f Israel on the same day, which will be 
analyzed in detail in Chapter Two.
The purpose o f Zionism during the first years o f statehood seemed clear— 
which was to consolidate and defend Israel, to explain and justify its existence. 
Nahum Goldmann, head o f the WZO from 1951 to 1968, argued that Zionism must 
preserve Jewish life in the Diaspora. American Zionists, notably Rabbi Mordecai 
Kaplan, founder o f the Reconstructionist movement, urged a redefinition o f Judaism 
and warned about the dangers o f creating a schism between Israel and Diaspora 
Jewry. During the 1970s, much Zionist activity focused on Soviet Jewry, who was 
finally allowed to emigrate in restricted numbers. Again, differences arose between 
Zionist and Jewish relief agencies; whether immigration to Israel should be the only 
option offered to Soviet Jews or not. A massive wave o f immigration by Soviet Jews 
to Israel began in the late 1980s.
Zionism has been repeatedly denounced by the Arab nations and their 
supporters as a “tool o f imperialism.” In 1975, the UN adopted a resolution equating
56 Cohen, 1995: 3.
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Zionism with racism; in 1991, the General Assembly voted 111 to 25 for repeal. 
Today Zionism is based on the unequivocal support o f two basic principles— t^he 
autonomy and safety of the state o f Israel and the right o f any Jews to settle there (the 
Law of Return) which provides a guarantee o f a Jewish nationality to any Jew in need 
of it. ”
1.3. Turkish-Jewish Relations (1923-1947)
1.3.1. Relations During The Turkish War Of Independence
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and 
after the Armistice o f Mondros in 30 October 1918, Turkish society faced a very 
important problem which was the high probability o f the division o f the homeland. In 
order to survive with sovereignty and independence, Turks had to fight on two fronts; 
against the sovereignty of the Sultan and against allied invaders. The primary aim of 
the Turkish War o f Independence was to rescue the Ottoman Empire from the 
destruction o f Western colonialism and to build a Nation-State. According to Mustafa 
Kemal, the main principle o f the Turkish War of Independence’s foreign policy was to 
introduce to the world “the nation’s external and internal sovereignty” and the 
nation’s ability to determine its future.*^ Turkish War o f Independence defined the 
geographical boundaries o f the Turkish State which rlimited its political and military 
goals.
On 28“* January 1920, a manifesto called the National Pact (Misak-i Milli) was 
adopted. It officially stated the aims o f the resistance movement and was based on
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the earlier resolutions o f the Erzurum and Sivas C ongresses.W ith  the declaration of 
the National Pact, Mustafa Kemal mobilized the Turkish society against the invaders 
and between 1919 and 1923, the Turkish War o f Independence movement was carried 
out.^* During the war o f independence, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had asked the Kuva-yi 
Milliye to deal with the religious minorities with “kindness and in a humanitarian 
manner” soon after his arrival to Samsun on 19 May 1919.^^ The Jewish community 
had witnessed these tolerant attitudes and other humanitarian policies. They were also 
affected as well as the Turkish society from the Ottoman’s defeat after World War I 
and the invasion o f Turkish territories by the allies.*^
The conclusion o f Mondros Armistice Treaty on 30th October 1918 gave rise 
to the reaction of the Turkish society against the foreign powers. In May 1919, this 
movement gained its ideological, sociological and political grounds under Mustafa 
Kemal’s leadership. This movement was based on realistic grounds and objectives. 
Unlike other minorities, the Jewish society accepted the ideology o f “Turkish 
Nationalism”. Therefore, during the Turkish War o f Independence, Jews contributed 
to Turkey’s acquisition o f independence with their heroic contributions during the 
war, their resistence by various means and their decisive attitudes mostly as a whole 
society against the common enemies while certain minorities rioted in cooperation 
with the invaders. So it can be said that during the national struggle period of Turkey, 
Jews expressed their loyalty and support to the Turkish movement and to Mustafa 
Kemal against the Allies at both organizational and individual levels.
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The years o f 1919-1922 consisted o f wars and struggles with many states 
(with the Istanbul Government, districtive forces and Great Britain, France, Italy, the 
Soviet Union, Armenia and Greece).®'* Invaders imposed discriminatory policies 
towards the Christian community during the Turkish War of Independence and 
especially Jews living in Istanbul faced many difficulties due to these policies. 
Therefore they supported the Ottoman Empire’s war efforts. After the war, most o f 
the Christian minority was expelled from Turkish territories because o f the support 
they had given to the allies during the war. But the Jews stayed in Turkey and were 
considered as the unique loyal minority o f the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish War 
of Independence.®* Mostly from the general anxiousness, by the end of 1922 there 
was an increasing rate o f emigration. Turkish Jews settled in many countries and the 
rate of emigration was very high. Therefore the ratio o f Jews living in Turkey reduced 
by 50 percent. ®®
In May 1919, during the invasion of Izmir, Greeks killed both Turks and Jews. 
During this period as before, Jews supported Mustafa Kemal’s Anadolu Movement.®’ 
Especially Greeks who were living in Turkish territories put pressure on Jews and 
harmed them. On the other hand unlike other minorities, Jews remained loyal to Turks 
and refrained from collaborating with Greeks. In Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
defined collaboraters (with allies) as “Christian” elements, instead of calling them 
“Non-Muslims” which indicated the exclusion o f the Jewish community from this
^''Levi, 1998:14-15
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category.®* After the Turkish War o f Independence, during a conference in Izmir, a 
lycee student asked Mustafa Kemal about his opinion about Jews’ life in Turkey and 
his answer was;
by proving their loyalty to this people and country till now, Jews 
continued their life in welfare and will continue their life in welfare and 
loyalty.”
Jews were anxious, after the dissolution o f an empire in which they lived freely 
and comfortably for decades. Because of being expelled from many states in their 
history, they were afraid o f being expelled from these territories again by the new 
regime. Another point of concern of Jews was, the possibility o f Greeks domination o f 
Anatolia, because in the past they had killed more than 5000 Jews in Mora and 
Selanik (an issue which could never be forgotten).™
In the beginning, Turkish newspapers accused Jews o f Jewish desire to 
dominate Turkey economicaly and not using or talking Turkish language. But during 
the Laussane Agreement, the priviledges o f minorities were put forward and Jews 
decided to give up their rights. As a result o f this attitude, the criticisms o f the 
Turkish public opinion was reduced and the perspective o f the Turkish public opinion 
changed. The collaboration between Turks and Jews was established in the National 
Struggle Period and reached a highly surprising level which surprized especially the 
European Media (when Ankara initiated to establish Turkish Commercial Union with 
Jews just before the Great Attack). ’’ The Turkish War o f Independence was won in 
1922 and politically confirmed by the Laussane Treaty in 1923 when the Allies made
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peace with Turkey and accepted the emergence o f an independent national Turkish 
State7^
Mustafa Kemal’s emphasis on territorial integrity and political independence 
was the main objective o f his tactful and foresighted diplomacy during this period 
(1919-1922) more specifically at the Laussane Conference where Turkey was 
considered as an equal state with the allies and also reversed the dictated Sevres 
Treaty of lO* August 1920 very successfully. ’^Although the Turkish delegation faced 
many difficulties during the negotiations, at the end they achieved their objectives. 
Three main issues were negotiated which were territorial and military issues as well as 
economic and financial issues and the position o f foreigners and minorities. On the 
minorities issue, Turkey had to protect its citizens regardless o f their beliefs, 
nationality or language, but there had to be no supervision on Turkey’s policies 
towards minorities.
The question of “what will be the status o f minorities in the new Turkish 
State” had already been answered in the National Pact. This document stated that “the 
legal rights o f minorities are guarranteed to them, provided the Muslim populations o f 
the states surrounding us are also extended the same rights and protection. These 
minority rights are determined by the political agreements between the victorious and 
the vanquished nations and their respective partners” .’’ In the Sivas Congress with 
one difference it was declared that, “settling the problem of the four minority groups 
by means o f accepting their separate sovereignty is absolutely unacceptable”. As
'' U vi, 1998:66. 
Gönlübol, 1974: 2. 
Tamkoc, 1961:6. 
'^'Zürcher, 1993:168-170. 
Zürcher, 1993:177.
26
stated above, the Jewish minority accepted these principles and collaborated with the 
resistance movement. So in general and in return, Turks were tolerant to Jews and 
protected them from Greek and Armenian restrictions and pressures. At the end of the 
Turkish War o f Independence Jews were satisfied with the result.
1.3.2. Establishment of the Turkish Republic and Minority Policy Till the End 
of the Second World War
The Ottoman Sultanate was abolished on 1 November 1922 and the country 
was ruled by the National Assembly. The president and the ministers were elected 
directly by the Assembly. The legal relations between the Caliph, Abdiilmecit Efendi 
and the Assembly were unclear. During this period, Mustafa Kemal declared his 
intentions about changing this confiised situation and the establishment o f a repubhc. 
He submitted a proposal to establish a republic with an elected president, a prime 
minister that would be appointed by the president and a conventional cabinet system. 
The majority o f the representatives in the assembly accepted the proposal and on 29 
October 1923, the Turkish Republic was established. The first president was Mustafa 
Kemal and the first prime minister was İsmet İnönü.^ During the transition period, 
there were anti-republican movements based on the concern o f the future o f the caliph 
but, with developments and reforms, these movements were settled.
After 29 October 1923, Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues as a first mission 
began to consolidate the power of the new state. In 1924, the caliphate was
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abolished and the Ottoman dynasty was sent to exile. The first steps of the principles 
of Atatürk began to be taken, especially towards secularism. There were also other 
contributions which strengthened the relations between Turkey and Europe, some of 
them were, secularization o f all levels o f administration, judicial reforms, the adoption 
of the Latin alphabet and the Western calendar and the prohibition o f the dressing of 
traditional and religious costumes. The Caliphate and Şeyhülislam institutions, tekkas 
and tarikats were abolished, foundations were put under government control and 
religious administrators acquired the status o f government off icia ls .These reforms 
brought Turkey closer to the European countries’ structure and the policies became 
westernized. Mustafa Kemal believed that if they would take Western developments 
as a model, Turkey could develop and become more civilized.*®
In the new Turkish Republic due to being a sovereign nation-sate, the 
existence of independent minorities was unacceptable. But they had nearly the same 
rights with other citizens. The 1924 Constitution accepted the principal of equality 
between religions and races in article 88.** But in practice, there were some 
limitations on the minorities. For example, they were not allowed to work in any 
political organization, in the army and were not allowed to take part either in national 
or regional level decision-making. But they had the right to vote and to be elected. 
On the other hand, during the negotiations for the Constitution, the Jewish community 
demanded equality and integration with the Turkish society rather than demanding any 
other rights or guarantees. When the Jews asked for the rejection of the application of 
article 42 o f  the Lausanne Treaty to their community, the Turks established closer
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relations with the Jewish community. This article foresaw to solve the conflicts 
among the minorities in regard to their own procedures and customs, So by rejecting 
the article, Jews gave all the missions of the clergymen concerning the social life 
issues to the secular institutions to the Turkish Republic.*  ^The press and the majority 
of Turkish society admired this attitude and better relations were established and 
sympathy towards Jews increased.*^
In the 1927-33 period, the Turkish Republic was recognized by other states 
and there was no objection to its independence and sovereignty. The Mousul conflict 
was partially solved, the debts o f the Empire were paid and commercial companies 
were bought from foreigners. The population began to increase and trade developed. 
There was no possible threat expected from the minorities, therefore the status o f 
minorities became better. As a result o f mostly tolerance and economic revival, from 
1927 onwards-Jewish migration to other countries decreased and especially in 1930s 
it had stopped. In 1933, when the Nazis came to power in Germany, Jews migrated to 
Turkey. Turks considered Western democracy as an ideal model. Therefore, Hitlerism 
and anti-Semitism were not supported in Turkey. At this period most o f the Jews 
living in Germany thought that the crisis was temporary and therefore did not want to 
give up their citizenships. As a result, the migration o f Jews into Turkey in 1933 was 
unlike the mass migration in 1492 into the Ottoman Empire.*'* As in the past, the 
Turkish Republic again fought against any pressure on Jews and they continued their 
support in every field.**
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Turkish foreign policy in the 1923-1939 period can be divided into two 
phases, the first phase was between 1923 and 1930 which was a period o f status-quo 
and the second phase was between 1930 and 1939 which comprises a period o f crisis. 
In general, the main principles o f the Turkish Foreign Policy were:
- to maintain and strengthen its existence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity;
- to guard vital interests;
to establish and promote fnendly and harmonious relations with all states 
especially with neighbors and international co operations;
- to promote peace.*®
The new policy o f the Turkish Republic since its establishment until the 
Second World War can be characterized as: realistic, cautious, defensive and aimed to 
preserve the status-quo and the victory o f 1923 .*^  Also the principle o f “peace at 
home, peace in the world” was formulated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and became the 
cornerstone o f Turkish foreign policy. In order to consolidate its security, Turkey 
entered into bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with its neighbors and 
other powers. **
When the danger o f Western invasion was eliminated, Turkish policies turned 
towards the West and parallel to this movement in the domestic politics, there was an 
attempt o f transition to a “multiparty system”. With these attempts in 1930, the 
Liberal Party was established and according to Lord Kinross, this was a step taken by 
Atatürk in order to have the West recognize Turkey.*^ These features, reforms in its 
traditions and institutions of the old order and transformation into a Western nation
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distinguished Turkey from the Asian-Arabic culture.^ From the proclamation o f the 
Turkish Republic in 1923 till the beginning o f the Second World War, Turkey 
remained far from the events that took place in the Middle East.^'
Until 1930, Turkey had to deal with the problems that were left from the 
Laussane Treaty and after 1930 Turkey was affected by the “World Economic Crisis” 
and the expansionist and aggressive “fascist” and “Nazi” regimes in Europe. In this 
conjuncture, between 1930 and 1939 Turkish foreign policy changed in order to 
maintain Collective Peace and Security and by being a member in the League of 
Nations in 1932, Turkey began to work on collective security efforts and to establish 
a place in the international community as a modem state. After the death o f Atatürk 
on 10th November 1938, İsmet İnönü who had been the prime minister for a long 
time during Atatürk’s time, was elected as the president after a few months. İsmet 
İnönü kept Celal Bayar as the prime minister, but basically because of having different 
perspectives, Celal Bayar resigned and after a couple o f months Dr. Refik Saydam 
became the prime minister.^^ Despite changes in the administration, Turkish foreign 
policy and policies towards the Jews remained same.
In August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was announced in which Hitler’s 
Germany and Stalin’s Russia mostly divided and shared Eastern Europe between 
them. With this attempt France and Britain became more anxious about securing 
Turkish support and on 19 October 1939, the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty o f mutual
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support was signed. According to the treaty, if a European state attacked Turkey, 
Britain and France would come to its assistance and Turkey would ally itself with 
Britain or France if a war in which they were involved spread to the Mediterranean 
(i.e. if Italy became involved). But despite this alliance, Turkey was making an effort 
to clarify its relations with the Soviet Union. Turkey refrained from the Soviet 
Union’s consideration o f the alliance as directed against its existence.
The war spread to the Mediterranean on 10 June 1940, when Italy declared 
war on France and Britain. Turkey succeeded in remaining out of the war.^^ But there 
was an increasing pressure from the allies to have Turkey involved in the war and 
Turkey resisted to remain actively neutral. Throughout the war, both press and 
domestic politics were kept under strict control and were manipulated as a part of 
Turkey’s effort to stay out of the conflict. After imposing such pressure on Turkey, 
the allies stated that if Turkey stayed out o f the war for a long time, it would be 
completely isolated after the end o f the war. If Turkey would be isolated, it had to 
face the Red Army and any demands o f Stalin. After the assessments, president İnönü 
decided to take part on the allied side and declared war on Germany.^’
When Turkey broke its relations with Germany in 1944, the aid to Jews 
became publicised and migration to Turkey in mass began. Especially Jews from 
Bulgaria and Romania were permitted to migrate to Palestine and thousands o f Greek 
and Rhodian Jews were given the right o f asylum. Apart from these, thousands of
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Jewish citizens o f Turkey were rescued from France, Italy, Belgium and 
Netherlands.^*
Throughout the Second World War, Turkey had established closer ties with 
the West and especially with the United States o f America. The relations developed 
more when the United States extended its foreign aid to Turkey firstly under the 
Truman Doctrine and secondly under the Marshall Plan.^^ In general, the defeat o f the 
Axis powers brought a victory for democratic values and Turkey had a rapid 
transition to a democratic multi-party system. The general trend was a movement of 
liberalization and this challenge positively affected the Jewish community both in 
political and economic areas. At the end o f World War II, Turkey became a founding 
member o f the United Nations (UN) and this was followed by the membership in the 
Council o f Europe in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 
and the OECD in 1960.
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CHAPTER 2
ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAEL
2.L Establishment of Israel
Jews began to build the infrastructure of their longed for dream, a Jewish state 
in Palestine’”^  and began to publish their various works, make propaganda and 
develop their language, Hebrew. In 1907, the British Commonwealth conference 
convened and as a result, the delegates agreed unofficially to accept the establishment 
of a foreign state (later this state would be Israel) in the Middle East. After this 
conference, Britain began to concentrate its policies on the issues o f Palestine and the 
Jews. After a while, Britain began to direct Jews towards Palestine and supported 
the migration o f Jews into Palestine. The immigration rate increased greatly and these 
immigrants began to buy land in Palestine.*®^
In 1917 and 1918, the Arabs helped Britain to capture Palestine from the 
Ottoman Turks and the Arabs revolted against the Turks because Britain had 
promised them to grant independence after the war. With the Balfour Declaration on 
2 November 1917, Britain again officially declared its support to the Jews in order to 
establish a nation-state in Palestine. But the Arabs opposed this declaration. The 
declaration was followed by a Contract of the League o f Nations on June 1919, which
^Gonliibol, 1974;.6
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also included an article that recognized the temporary independence o f the Arab 
provinces under the former Ottoman Empire under the authority o f the British 
mandate. Parallel to the Balfour Declaration, Britain continued to apply other 
organized plans and supported large scale of Jewish immigration to Palestine and 
published a document, which stated the proclamation o f Jewish-Arab State in 
Palestine on September 1921. But this document, which was prepared with the 
ideology o f Zionism, was not applied due to the Arab opposition. In 1922, the League 
of Nations ratified the administration o f the British mandate in Palestine and also 
accepted the document o f mandate.*“^
During this period, the Jews settled in new centers o f Palestine. In 1925, the 
Jewish population was nearly 110.000 but with British support, Jewish migration 
increased rapidly and began to unbalance and decrease the ratio o f the Palestinian 
population over the Jewish population. Mostly because o f the increasing migration 
rate, conflicts began between the two populations. It can be said that during the 
British mandate period between 1922 and 1948, it was almost impossible for Britain 
to reconcile the Jewish and Palestinian communities as, Britain openly supported the 
Jews. As a result, anti-zionist attacks occurred both in Jerusalem in 1920 and Jaffa in 
1921. The immigration rate was intentionally growing and at the same time they were 
developing at economic, cultural and social levels with the support o f Britain. In 1929 
after the first conflict broke out between Arabs and Jews, under the leadership of 
Lord Passfield a commission convened and as a result, Britain foresaw to impose 
limitations over the Jewish migration into Palestine and over the purchase of land o f 
Jews in Palestine. The commission also decided to establish a legislative organ, which
Mattar, 1995: 3-4.
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consisted of both Arab and Jewish communities. But due to the demands of the Jews 
and Jewish migration from the Nazi massacre, the decisions could not be imposed and 
the situation increased the tension between Arabs and Jews. In 1933, especially when 
Nazis came to power in Germany, Jewish immigration increased.*®* In 1935, nearly 
62.000 Jews migrated to Palestine. Both Muslim and Christian Palestinians revolted in 
1936 and the migration continued until 1939. As a result o f these movements, finally 
Britain imposed limitations over Jewish immigration and the purchase of the land.*®®
On April 1936, Arab leaders convened and established the High Committee o f 
Arabs, which would lead Palestinian Arabs struggle against the Jews. General strikes 
began with the Committee's support and at the end of the year, the struggle changed 
its form into a national riot. Under the leadership o f Lord Peel, a commission went to 
Palestine in order to examine the conflict and on July 1937, the commission decided 
that the Arabs and Jews could not live in a common state and published a report, 
which proposed the partition o f Palestine. As a result o f this partition plan, Arab riots 
in Palestine increased and the riots continued until 1939. During this period, 
thousands o f Arabs and hundreds o f British soldiers and Jews died.*®’
The riots o f the Palestinians and Arabs and opposition in Palestine made 
Britain anxious before the outbreak o f the Second World War. In order to maintain 
the Arabs' support on their side, Britain published a declaration, which abandoned the 
partition o f Palestine and foresaw the establishment o f an independent “Palestine 
State” within 10 years. The declaration also restricted Jewish migration into Palestine
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and the purchase o f land by Jews. When World War II began, both Arabs and Jews 
opposed to this report and therefore it was not implemented. After the end o f the 
Second World War, Britain became powerless in the region and could not perform its 
mandate authority. Therefore on February 1947, Britain applied to the United Nations 
in order to solve the Palestine conflict.
In 1918, the Jewish population in Palestine was nearly 85.000, between 1919 
and 1948 the population increased to 580.000, between 1948 and 1985, 1.750.000 
immigrants were added and in 1987, the Jewish population increased to 3.349.997 
and reached a ratio o f 82.97 percent over the aggregate population rate.^®^
In order to find a solution to the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine, various 
plans were initiated at different times. The Peel Commission Report in 1932 foresaw 
the partition o f Palestine between Arabs and Jews and if  this solution could not be 
applied, they recommended a federal system o f cantons. In 1938, the Woodhead 
Commission Plan also recommended partition and in 1939 Britain declared that it 
would give independence to Jews within 10 years in Palestine. But both Arabs and the 
Jews opposed this declaration.“ ® Arab States, which had gained their independence 
around the Palestine region, established the Arab League in 1945 and declared their 
opposition towards any possibility o f Jewish statehood.
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At different time periods, various plans for solving the Palestine conflict were 
initiated, but these attempts were unsuccessful. On 18th February 1947, in order to 
determine the future o f Palestine, Britain finally applied to the United Nations (UN). 
The UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was established in order to draft 
the proposals concerning the future of Palestine and delegates began to make 
investigations in Palestine."^ During UNSCOP’s five weeks in Palestine, the delegates 
wrote reports and had hearings. On 31 August 1947, UNSCOP finished its report and 
laid down eleven principles, some of them were; the mandate should be ended and 
independence should be given at the earliest applicable date; the political structure o f 
the new state or states should be “basically democratic”, the economic unity o f 
Palestine must be maintained; the security o f holy places and access to them should be 
assured; the General Assembly should immediately carry out an arrangement to solve 
the urgent problem o f a quarter million o f Jews in Europe. On the application o f these 
principles, UNSCOP was divided seven to three. As a majority; Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay 
recommended partition and as a minority; India, Iran and Yugoslavia recommended 
federation. The Australian delegate abstained."^
The Majority Plan foresaw to end the mandate regime and division of 
Palestine in order to establish one Arab and a Jewish State. The city o f Jerusalem 
would be independent, but it would be under the observation o f the UN and would
2.1.1. The UN Partition Plan and the Establishment of Israel
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also have international status. According to the plan, the new status of Jerusalem 
would also enhance economic cooperation between the Arab and Jewish states. 
On the other hand, the Minority Plan foresaw the establishment o f a federative state, 
which would be composed of Jewish and Arab cantons with Jerusalem as a capital. 
The cantonal authority would dominate the internal politics but issues like 
immigration, international relations and national defense would be under the authority 
o f the central government, which would consist o f a bicameral legislature in which 
one house would function by equal representation and the other by proportional 
representation."'* However the Arabs opposed both the “Majority Plan” considering it 
as a destruction o f Palestinian integrity and the “Minority Plan” considering it as 
separatist and its suggestion o f the establishment o f a democratic state.’"  They 
wanted to solve the problem through the international court. After a while, a special 
committee was organized to investigate these plans and these proposal plans were 
presented to the UN.’"
On 29 November 1947, as a result o f the UN General Council’s voting, the 
UN decided the partition o f Palestine into two states as one Arab and one Jewish 
State (the Majority Plan) and agreed to give Jerusalem international status. This 
decision not only gave the right to the Jews to establish a state in Palestine, but also 
gave more rights than their low ratio of population. Arabs again reacted to this 
decision.’”  This decision was taken at the UN General Assembly with 33 votes, while
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13 votes were against it (including Turkey) and there were 10 neutral votes. 
Consequently, Britain decided to withdraw its forces from Palestine.*^*
On 14 May 1948, the British Mandate ended and under the leadership o f Ben 
Gurion, the Jewish National Council convened in Tel Aviv and the State of Israel was 
established. On the first day, the new state was recognized by the United States, 
within one or two days by the Soviet Union and within a month by nine states. In the 
same month (May) Israel was accepted to the United Nations as a member state with 
the decision of the General Council on 11 May 1949, number 273 (111).*^ ° On 9 
March 1950, Turkey recognized Israel de jure  and became the first Muslim state to 
recognize Israel. Therefore, Turkey had to face many reactions from the Arab States 
(especially from Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen). 
This declaration caused Arabs to move to other regions and changed the map o f the 
Middle East. It also constituted the basis o f strifes and challenges for the Middle East 
Peace Process.
As a result of the emergence of the Israeli State, the Palestine conflict gained 
new dimensions. The Palestine Question became the main element of conflict between 
Arabs and Jews; among Arabs themselves; between Arabs and the West; between 
Israel and the West as well as between the United States and the Soviet Union. This 
issue caused instability between regional states’ relations on political, social and 
military grounds. On the other hand, the West transformed the Jewish-Christian
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conflict to the Middle East in the form o f a Jewish-Muslim conflict. Israel owed its 
existence to the Western sympathy and remorse for Jewish suffering, the political 
influence o f American Jews in securing the support of President Harry S. Truman and 
to Britain’s loss o f will to continue its rule in Palestine.
2.1.2. International Relations of Israel During the First Years
During the early years of the state o f Israel, its main objective was to 
consolidate and defend Israel and to explain and justify its existence to the whole 
world. The establishment o f Israel caused worldwide repercussions especially in the 
Middle East because of being located in the center o f a region where the religions o f 
Islam, Christianity and Judaism were bom and spread to the world and because o f the 
status o f the holy city o f three faiths; Jemsalem. Therefore from that date up to the 
present, it has retained its importance and consists o f the major basis o f the Arab 
Israel conflict.
2.I.2.I. Relations with the Middle East Countries
Before and after the estabhshment of Israel, the Arab states opposed the 
existence o f the Jewish population on Arab and Muslim lands. The reactions rose 
especially with the partition decision of the UN and continued. A day after the
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proclamation o f the State of Israel on 15 May 1948, an army consisting o f Egypt, 
Transjordan (now The State o f Jordan), Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese forces attacked 
Israel, named as the First Arab-Israeli War.
In order to solve the conflict between Israel and the Arabs, the UN Swedish 
mediator Cont Benodotte was appointed on 20 May 1948 and succeeded in 
maintaining a ceasefire between the parties. In his report he stated the importance o f 
the recognition o f Israel by other states and recommended the determination o f the 
borders according to the principle o f “geographical homogenity and integration”. He 
also proposed the establishment of a compromising c o m m is s io n .T h e  Arabs were 
against the report, but the US and France supported it. On 12 December 1948, a 
commission composed o f representatives fi'om the US, France and Turkey, called the 
Palestine Compromisory Commission, was established. Under the supervision o f the 
commission, four Arab States and Isreal convened and negotiations began on the 
fiiture o f the Palestinian refugees, giving Jerusalem international status and the 
determination o f boundaries. But the parties to the negotiations could not agree on 
the referred points and on 25 July the negotiations ended.
In spite of the active attempts o f the UN, the war continued until the end of 
summer 1949 and the war ended with a cease-fire. At the end o f  the war, Israel 
defeated the Arab States and acquired some parts of the Arab lands, considered as 
well as politically important. The war was concluded with four armistice agreements
against the UN’s decision and ai^ly precise precautions. They also declared that the partition plan 
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between Israel as one party and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria as the other party
by the assistance o f the UN arrangements. In the armistice agreements, the frontiers
were defined and remained until they were changed during the Six Day War in 1967. 
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After the establishment o f Israel, Egypt entered in small scale conflicts with 
Israel and joined the Arab efforts to prevent Jewish immigration. After the 
establishment o f Israel, Egypt entered into wars against Israel and terrorist activities 
took place in both states. In the First Arab-Israeli War, firstly Egypt was defeated and 
this caused the beginning o f the rise o f “Arab Nationalism”. On 24 February 1949, 
the Israel-Egypt General Armistice Agreement was signed on the island of Rhodes. 
According to this agreement during the period o f armistice, both parties were to 
refrain from acquiring advantages both militarily and politically and attacking each 
other from land, sea and air. The terms and conditions o f this agreement were the 
same with other armistice agreements that were signed between Israel and Egypt.
As a result, Egypt would have responsibility for the Gazza Strip, in which there was a 
high rate o f Palestinian refugees and West Jerusalem would be under the control of 
Israel. As a result o f this war, millions o f Palestinians had to leave their homelands 
and became refugees.
Lebanon, like other Arab States did not want a Jewish presence in the Middle 
East. Lebanon was also among the states which were affected the most from the 
struggles and instability in the Middle East. Also, Lebanon lands became a place 
where Palestinian refugees and guerillas became powerful. Therefore it had to face
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interventions from Israel and Syria. On 23 March 1949, Lebanon signed the armistice 
agreement with Israel in Ras Nakura. According to this armistice, Israel-Lebanon 
borders remained the same as the Lebanon Palestine border in the past. But the border 
would be demilitarized and as a first step both sides would keep less than 1500 
soldiers at the border zone.^^’
Jordan had a boundary with Israel. Therefore, it was threatened by the 
establishment o f the Israel-Jordan-Palestine Confederation. In general, Jordan wanted 
to have peaceful relations with Israel, but on the other hand there was Arab pressure 
and Palestinian refugees which would demonstrate against Jordan with the support of 
the Arab States. As a result o f this situation, Jordan chose to follow a moderate and 
balanced foreign policy in its relations with Israel. But before Israel’s establishment, 
Jordan was against the Jewish settlement centres and when Israel was established, 
Jordan acted with the Arab S t a t e s . O n  3 April 1949, Israel and Jordan also signed 
the armistice agreement on the island o f Rhodes. With this agreement. Western Sheria 
(today under the control o f Israel) and the east o f Jerusalem would be under the 
control o f Jordan. With this agreement, most o f the holy places remined on the 
Jordanian side.*^^
Since Israel’s foundation, Syria did not want and did not recognize the Jewish 
existence in the Middle East After the establishment o f Israel, Syria followed the 
same policies with the other Arab states such as trying to prevent Jewish migration to 
Palestine and also the establishment o f Israel. Like other Arab States, Syria entered 
into war against Israel in 1948 and was defeated like the rest. The following wars also
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led Syrians to increase their enmity towards Israel and Arab Nationalism also 
increased in Syria. So due to these policies and the internal problems o f Syria, the 
armistice agreement between Israel and Syria was signed at the end on 20 July 1949 
in Mishmar Hayerden. With this armistice, the Israeli-Syrian border would be 
approximately the same as the previous Palestine-Syrian border. But three regions 
which were sensitive for both sides o f the border would become demilitarized,
Iraq and Saudi Arabia did not sign an armistice agreement as Saudia Arabia 
did not have borders with Israel. But, when the UN mediator called Saudi Arabia for 
negotiation, it accepted the invitation and Iraq declared that it would accept the 
armistice agreements which would be signed by the other Arab states. These armistice 
agreements ended the First Arab-Israeli War, but did not solve the Palestine conflict, 
Israel’s defeat o f the Arabs at the end o f the war and its acquisitions of new territories 
deepened the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the establishment o f Israel, there had been 
wars between Arabs and Israel and in general Arab states acted as a whole in every 
conflict against Israel. Iraq and Libya like Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon had 
strongly opposed Israel and these countries supported the countries that fought 
against Israel either economically or logistically. Besides the above mentioned 
countries, Yemen, Umman, Kuwait and Qatar also opposed Israel.
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As stated above, before and after Israel’s establishment, Israel faced anti- 
zionist reactions against it and was isolated in the Middle East. This situation still 
partly continues today. Therefore in order to preserve its existence, Israel established 
better relations with non-Middle Eastern countries, especially with the U.S!. By the 
help o f Jewish lobbies and the sympathy of the people towards the Jewish community 
especially after the massacres o f the Nazis, forming good relations with the U.S. and 
the European countries was easy for Israel.
The decision to establish an Israeli State was strongly supported by the U.S. 
from the beginning and even after its realization at the same night, the U.S. 
recognized Israel. With the establishment o f Israel, the U.S. acquired a foothold to 
intervene or enter the region actively. Therefore the U.S. supported the existence of 
Israel in order to gain power in the Middle East. On the other hand, from Israel’s 
point of view, to maintain the continous support o f a super power was crucial for its 
existence. During and after the Arab-Israel Wars, Israel continuously relied on the 
economical, military and political support o f the U.S.
Israel also pursued to form good relations with other major countries outside 
the Middle East. Britain supported Jews right from the beginning, in order to 
establish their own state and its support still continues. Like the U.S., Britain also 
wants Israel to have a powerful status in the region. Therefore, Britain supported and 
supports Israel by providing an essential flow of capital, investment and weapons. The
2.1.2.2. Relations with the U. S. and Other Countries
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relations between Germany and Israel were not good because of the Nazi massacres 
that happened in the past. But after the Second World War; when Germany accepted 
the responsibility for massacres and signed a reparation agreement in 1952, the 
relations became better. Relations with France developed after 1956. But after 
blaming Israel for its 1967 attack, France ended its open support. With the exception 
o f the named three countries, Israel had better relations with other Western European
countries. 135
The relations between Israel and the Soviet Union began with its recognition 
o f the State o f Israel on 15 May 1948, after the attack o f five Arab States towards 
Israel. During the first Arab-Israel War, the Soviet Union sent aid to Israel by air and 
also provided other support. But, when Israel formed close relations with the U.S., 
the Soviet Union also began to have closer relations with the Arab States, and these 
close relations and support continued until the dissolution and disintegration o f the 
Soviet Union.
2.2. Turkish Foreign Policy towards the New State
Between 1945 and 1947; during the discussions about the resolution o f the 
Palestine Question in the United Nations, Turkey supported the Arab states. Also, on 
the decision concerning partition at the United Nations, Turkey voted against the 
partition. After the emergence o f Israel, first Arab-Israel War broke out and during 
this war Turkey officially remained neutral, but the press supported the Arab states.*^’
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Based on Stalin’s territorial demands on Kars and Ardahan and bases at the 
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, Turkey was expecting a possible threat from the 
Soviet Union. After the establishment o f the Republic, Turkey began to turn towards 
the West and followed a “Western Line” policy in its foreign relations*^* and based all 
o f its bilateral relations on an “East-West” context. After the Second World War, 
Turkey’s main aim became to remain in a Western Defence System against the Soviet 
threat and to gain the support o f the West and the U S. When Israel declared its 
independence on 14 May 1948, the Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett requested their 
recognition from Turkey. Because of the Soviet Union’s support in the establishment 
of Israel and the masses o f Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union to Israel, 
Israel’s “left-wing” character and its neutrality in the East-West conflict, Turkey had 
hesitations in recognizing the Israel State at the b e g in n in g .B u t ,  Turkey pursued a 
dignified policy towards Israel after its establishment. It can in general be said that the 
Turkish Foreign Policy during the 1945-1950 period was shaped by its security 
concerns.
On 30th June 1948, Turkey concluded a Postal Agreement with Israel, but did 
not recognize Israel with this agreement. The Arabs protested this agreement and 
Turkey declared that with this agreement it could reestablish relations with Israel, 
where 10.000 Turkish citizens were i n h a b i t i n g . B u t  after the declaration of the 
Truman Doctrine and by the implementation o f the Marshall Plan, Turkey began to 
pursue a more neutral policy on the Palestine conflict and also during the First Arab-
Soysal, 1994-1995: 69. 
Koni, 1994; 45-46. 
Nachmani, 1987: 45. 
Graen, 1996: 115.
48
Israeli War in 1948.**^ During the war period, under the government of Hasan Saka, 
Turkey prohibited its citizens who wanted to help either the Arabs or the Israelis 
traveling to this region. After a while this restriction was loosened and only traveling 
to Israel was restricted. At the end o f the war, on 15 September 1948, Turkey lifted 
its restrictions concerning travels to Palestine.’“*^ After lifting restrictions on traveling 
to Israel, most o f the Jews living in Turkey migrated to Israel.
After the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab States signed on 
28 March 1949, Turkey by appointing a chargé d ’affaires to Tel Aviv, de facto  
recognized this country and on 9 March 1950 by upgrading this representation level 
to a rank of “minister plenipotentiary” Turkey this time recognized Israel as de jure^** 
and Ambassador Seyflxllah Esin was appointed to Tel-Aviv. The reason behind 
Turkey’s recognition o f Israel was to establish close relations with the West and the 
U S and to gain their support. On the other hand Turkey faced strong reactions from 
Arab nations. While on 11 May 1949, voting on Israel’s membership to the U.N., 
there were 12 votes against, 37 for and 9 abstention votes, and Turkey was one o f the 
abstaining states in this voting. Turkey also pursued its neutrality during the 
negotiations in the ad hoc committee. But the Arabs’ reactions towards Turkey did 
not change. As a reaction to Turkish-Israel relations, Arab States have the strong 
tendency to isolate both nations from the Middle East, but primarily Israel.
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Arabs reacted against Turkey’s recognition and blamed Turkey for acting with 
the West. After Turkey’s recognition, Turkish Foreign Minister N.Sadak declared 
that:
“Israel is a reality. More than thirty countries have already recognized it. The 
Arab representatives are themselves holding talks with their Israeli counterparts.”*'**
According to Turkaya Ataov, Turkish Foreign Policy changed in accordance 
with the political and military collaboration o f Turkey with the group of NATO 
countries. Because o f the Turkish preference to join the group o f “western states”, 
Turkey recognized Israel and became the first Moslem country among the states that 
recognized Israel. Therefore, it was inevitable for Turkey to face reactions from the 
Arab states.*“*’ According to George E. Gruen, the basis o f Turkish recognition was to 
gain financial and political support from the U.S. When Israel was established, the 
U.S. at the same day recognized the new state with the support o f Truman. After this 
recognition in order to indicate to the West and the U.S. that Turkey was a secular 
and a modem state, Turkey recognized Israel. The reason behind this diplomatic 
initiative was to change the W est’s and the U  S ’ anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim 
perspectives. *“**
On the other hand, according to Hakan Yavuz, Turkey recognized Israel 
because o f the requirement to acquire Western support against the Soviet threat that 
existed in the years o f 1945 and 1947, and with the supporting views o f the Turkish 
elite to establish relations as an alternative to the Arab countries. There was a need for 
alternative relations in the Middle East. Because in 1916 the Arabs revolted against
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the Turks and Turkey began to pursue a secular policy and also aimed to de-Arabize 
and de-Islamize the Turkish society. Another reason for recognition was the moral 
point o f view, which was aimed to help end the Jewish persecution and to support the 
Jewish community. In general, this recognition was supported by the Turkish elites 
and Israel was considered as a modem and democratic state in the Middle East
region 149
Besides the reasons that are explained above, the recognition o f Israel by the 
Turkish Republic would have been beneficial for both states. From the Turkish 
perspective, Israel had power over the U.S. media (Jews own the best known TV 
channels in the U.S. which are: NBC (National Broadcasting Company) and CBS 
(Columbia Broadcasting System) and the best known newspapers which are; “New 
York Times”, “New York News” and “Washington Post” *^® and the Jewish lobby in 
the U.S. on political areas. Therefore, with the support o f  Israel, Turkey could acquire 
financial and other sort o f support from the West and the U.S. From Israel’s point of 
view, by the recognition o f Turkey, Israel would gain an ally in the region which it 
desperately needed because of being surrounded by hostile neighbours.
To keep in balance the relations with Israel and Arabs at the same time was 
very difficult for Turkey. Because, before the proclamation of the State of Israel, 
Turkey had good relations with the Arab states and after the emergence o f this new 
state and for a while, in order not to face the Arabs’ reactions any more and due to 
having a neutral status in the Palestine conflict, Israel and Turkey had continued their 
relations secretly. In general, it can be said that, Turkish-Israel relations were always 
affected and determined by the relations between Turkey and the Arab States.
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CHAPTER 3
TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS AFTER THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAEL (1950-1967)
3.1. Relations Between Turkey and Israel During 1950s
After the U.S., Britain and France recognized Israel in March 1949, the 
Turkish and Israeli state ministers exchanged visits. On 4 July 1950, a “Modus 
Vivendi on Commerce and Agreement on Payment Bases” and “Air Transportation 
Agreement” on 10 December 1951 were signed and the first and formal diplomatic 
steps were taken for recognition. The initial diplomatic relations were open to the 
influences of “external factors” and especially “the Arab factor” . Due to this, the two 
countries were enforced to follow “low profile” policies and from time-to-time 
outwardly relations appeared to reach to an “end” or to a “breaking” point. But in 
reality, Turkey and Israel cooperated especially on the issues of security and 
intelligence and implicitly developed this cooperation mostly in this period. During 
this period Turkish-Israel relations improved especially in social and cultural fields, as 
well as in sports. So, the development o f relations between the two countries were 
characterized by sensitivity and attempts of both parties to reach to a balance.
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During the 1950s, trade between Turkey and Israel was extensive. Israel’s 
imports from Turkey covered its entire cotton consumption and one half o f its wheat 
requirements (150,000 tons). In addition, Israel also imported from Turkey a variety 
o f other products such as dried fruit, fish, cattle and associated byproducts (cattle 
bones), oil, various grains, etc. On the other hand, Israeli exports to Turkey were 
equally varied, including pharmaceuticals, electrical appliances, cooking and heating 
stoves, refrigerators, cooking utensils, tyres, fertilisers, cement and building material. 
Israel refined Turkish crude oil and exported its products, constructed apartment 
buildings and laid out airports in Turkey. Although there is a scarcity o f information 
about the scope o f military equipment commerce between Turkey and Israel, Israeli 
goods and services offered to Turkey ranged from aerial photography and provision 
of topographical maps for military purposes, the delivery o f uniforms, ammunition, 
explosives, optical instruments, automotive spare parts etc^^^ In 1954, Israeli exports 
to Turkey amounted to 12,000,000 US Dollars and increased steadily.*”
Israel’s desire to sell its industrial and military products and its own know­
how to Turkey also contained the purpose o f impressing the West with the picture o f 
Israeli-Turkish strategic cooperation. But in attempting to achieve strategic 
cooperation, Israel not only had to contend with Turkish national sensitivity but also 
had to compete with the Arabs. So this situation exacerbated the already complicated 
Israel-Turkish-Arab triangle.
Turkey has also shared a de facto  security interest with Israel stemming from 
mutual distrust o f radical forces in the Middle East. In addition, Turkey has been well 
aware o f Israel’s strong support in the U.S., particularly in the Congress where
152 Nachmani, 1992: 21.
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Turkey had sought support too. Owing to the fact o f highly tolerant attitude of the 
Ottoman Empire towards its Jewish subjects over the centuries, Israel itself had 
always been sympathetic towards Turkey. Turkey began to form early and fairly close 
cooperation with Israel, after the fall o f the monarchy in Iraq in 1958, extensive 
intelligence exchanges on issues o f terrorism and Arab subversive movements took 
place Exchange o f intelligence on Lebanon has always been useful to Turkey as it 
provided opportunity to observe and assess anti-Turkish radical groups’ usage of the 
Bekaa Valley.
On May 1950, Turkey applied to NATO. At first, the application of Turkey 
was not supported by any of the NATO members, especially by Britain, but Italy was 
the only state to support the Turkish application. With the outbreak o f the Korean 
War on 25 June 1950, the Security Council declared that the attack of the Northern 
Korean forces to the territory o f Southern Korea breached peace. On 27 June, the UN 
called its members to give assistance in order to maintain international peace and 
security in the region. Turkey welcomed the Security Council’s decision on this 
particular subject and decided to send an armed force, which consisted o f 4500 
military personnel.'^*
After the outbreak of the Korean War, U S. applied pressure on Britain in 
order to persuade her to support Turkey’s application. After a while, Turkey informed 
London that on condition o f being accepted to NATO, she would be interested in and 
deal with the Middle East issues. With this political commitment, Britain was
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persuaded and supported Turkey’s application to NATO membership.**^ On 16-20 
September 1951, NATO Council of Ministers met in Ottawa and decided to accept 
both Turkey and Greece as NATO members. Turkey formally became a NATO 
member on 18 February 1952. After being a NATO member, Turkey started to 
receive aid for its military defense and began to pursue policies in the Western lines. 
At the United Nations, Israel and Turkey concluded voting pacts. Israel was among 
the states which actively lobbied South American representatives to support Turkey’s 
election to the Security Council.**^
Following the Korean War, Turkish relations with the United States and also 
with Israel flourished more. Israeli-Turkish relations gained priority. From Israel’s 
point o f view this meant, in addition to the political benefits of improving relations 
with a Moslem nation in the region and having commercial and other ties with 
Turkey, using the advantage o f Turkey’s international links and geographical position 
in the Middle East. In 1954, Turkey was the only country who was allied to three 
separate defence treaties which were NATO, the Balkan Pact and the Baghdad Pact. 
This unique position also strengthened Turkey’s political and military status in the 
region. Over the years, Turkey became aware of the need for finding the right balance 
between its interests and the role it should play in the Middle East.***
After Turkey became a NATO member in 1952, Turkey began to pursue 
world politics rather than the Middle East politics. Turkey, considered the conflicts in 
the Middle East as conflicts between the blocks, Israel and the Arab states considered 
the basis o f conflicts from a narrow and concrete perspective. According to Israel,
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Arab states aimed to destroy Israel and according to the Arab states, Israel struggled 
to have its existence recognized by other states. For Turkey, NATO was not only just 
a security alliance, but also enhanced the Turkish-U.S. relationship at military, social 
and economic fields. Turkey began to get more involved in Middle Eastern issues and 
began to play an active role in the name o f the West. So this situation affected the 
relations between Turkey and the regional states for the worst. With the active role 
assigned to her by her allies, Turkey began to take part and to lead the Pacts in the 
region as mentioned above. But the only exception to the Western oriented Turkish 
Foreign Policy was the Cyprus issue, where Turkey unilaterally created a new status 
quo. However this status quo failed to receive any international legitimacy and 
support, while it served Turkish national interests.*^”
After 1950 Turkey pursued an anti-communist policy due to the serious Soviet 
threat. For Turkey, there was a world, which consisted o f communist and non­
communist states. Turkey began to view all o f its bilateral relations within this 
context. Israel remained neutral in its foreign policy at the beginning, Turkey was 
suspicious about Israel’s tendency and was afraid o f Israel in the sense that it could 
constitute a communist threat in the future. It was apprehended that the neutral policy 
of Israel would serve the Russian aims. But in order to convince Turkey that Israel 
did not have a communist tendency, during the Korean War, Israel declared that it 
would support the policy o f the UN General Assembly, which foresaw intervening to 
the Korean War. Commercial and military co-operation between the Turkey and Israel 
had improved, but military cooperation had continued in secrecy.*^* Turkey and Israel
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exchanged military information. Therefore, Arabs interpreted the exchange of 
information as the existence o f a military agreement and from time to time, Arab 
states accused Turkey for signing a military agreement with Israel. But, Turkey kept 
on rejecting this accusation.
Between 1950 and 1955, Arab nationalism developed while struggling with 
Israel. During this period, Turkey did not face any reactions from the Arab states 
since she did not play an active role in the region. But after taking an active role in the 
Baghdad Pact and getting involved in the region, Turkey faced rivalry from the Arab 
world for the leadership o f the region. So all o f these factors led to the increase of a 
sharp Arab nationalism
3.1.1.The Balkan Pact
In the spring o f 1951, despite Turkey’s promise to Britain “to  deal with the 
Middle East issues” before its membership to NATO, she began to establish 
diplomatic relations with the Balkan states. At the same time, the US was anxious 
about the tense relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and was looking 
for a solution to provide the security o f Yugoslavia. The solution considered to save 
this state was to establish a Balkan Pact among Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece. With 
this aim, the U S. encouraged Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia to establish closer 
relations.**^ On February 1953, the Balkan Treaty was concluded and as a result of
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this, the Balkan Pact in August 1954 was concluded between Turkey, Greece and 
Yugoslavia. The Pact provided mutual entente and a cooperation among the three 
countries which were threatened by Moscow and by other communist neighbors.
After Turkey’s membership to NATO, the Soviet Union changed its policy 
negatively towards Turkey and this now directly started to threaten the relations 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union. So this new threat concept led Turkey to 
establish a new defense pact in order to protect its security. Because Yugoslavia was 
no more in the Soviet Block since 1948, and based its economy and defense power on 
the U S. aid, it was possible to include Yugoslavia in a new alliance system. From the 
Turkish-Greece side before being NATO members, both states made efforts to enter 
into NATO and during this period, they became closer. So on 28 February 1953, 
Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia signed a Treaty o f Friendship and Cooperation in 
Ankara. This was not an independent alliance agreement, but an important step 
towards a clox partnership. According to the agreement, the three states would 
cooperate on economic, defense and on common defense issues. Also according to 
the article 6 o f the agreement; “parties should not join to any alliance or movement, 
which was against the interests o f any o f the parties” .
In 1953 and 1954, the Turkish government tried to transform the cooperation 
and friendship agreement into an alliance. But during this period, Greece began to 
play an active role in the activities in Cyprus, and Turkey was against these activities. 
Despite Turkey’s difficult status, in order to establish the Balkan Pact, Turkey ignored 
the situation. As a result, on 9 August 1954, the Balkan Pact was signed by Turkey, 
Greece and Yugoslavia in Bled, Yugoslavia. The Pact was concluded for a period o f
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twenty years and according to this alliance, in the case of an armed attack towards 
one of the parties, the contracting states would consider this attack as directed 
towards them and will use their right to collective self defense. Member states would 
also establish a “Permanent Council”, which would consist o f the ministers of foreign 
affairs of the parties.
Despite the belief o f Balkan Pact’s strengthening the eastern flank of NATO, 
from the spring o f 1955 the Balkan Pact began to lose its power. After the death of 
Stalin, Soviet Russia attempted to establish closer relations with Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslavian leaders were ready to revise their relations with the Soviet Russia. But at 
the same time, in case o f necessity they also wanted to keep the Balkan Pact as a 
leverage to Soviet Russia. After the visits o f Khruchev and Bulganin to Belgrade in 
May 1955, Yugoslavia lost its belief in the Balkan Pact and with also Greece’s 
attempt to use the Pact for its imperialistic aims on Cyprus. Therefore, especially from 
1955 with the Cyprus issue, Turkey and Greece got involved in a struggle and the 
alliance lost its effectiveness and aim.‘**
When the Cyprus conflict grew in intensity, the understanding between the 
three Balkan countries lost all o f its substance. But, Israel perceived the Balkan Pact 
as an ideal objective for securing military assistance. Israel hoped that Turkey’s 
advanced position in the Balkans would lead Ankara to neglect the Middle East. So 
when Turkey’s attention would be directed towards the Balkans, Israel hoped that 
Turkey would lose its interest in the Middle East, which would make it less vulnerable 
to the Arab influence. In other words, Israel’s hope vis-à-vis Turkey soared in
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consequence o f that country’s adherence to the Balkan Pact.’®’ Because from Israel’s 
perspective, while Turkey and Israel were Western backed alliances, Israel would be 
strengthened by Turkey’s adherence to the Balkan Pact and weakened through 
Turkey’s approach to the East.*^*
After the changes in relations between the members of the Pact, although the 
Pact was established for twenty years, one year after its foundation, the Balkan Pact 
existed as de jure  but it was abolished as de facto. The Pact formally continued until 
June 1960 till the declaration o f denouncing the Pact,
3.1.2. The Baghdad Pact
After the Korean War, the U.S. began to get interested in the defence of the 
Middle East due to a possible Soviet threat in the region; just as the Soviet Union’s 
threat to the allies during the Korean War. Another threat was the Soviet Russia’s 
closeness to the Middle East and the region’s non-integration to the western block. 
The U.S. rather than Britain, began to deal with the security issues o f the region. In 
order to establish a defense pact in the Middle East, it would not be suitable for 
Western states to take part in the establishment o f a new pact, because Arab states 
were hostile to France and Britain and therefore they were also against the U.S. 
Therefore, a Middle Eastern state should lead a defense pact that would be established 
in the Middle East. Because, Turkey was the most powerful state in the region and at 
the same time the only NATO member among the Middle Eastern countries. Those
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were the best possible causes for Turkey to lead the defense pact. Also while entering 
NATO, Turkey promised to play an active role in defending the Middle East. So it 
was Turkey’s turn to play an active role in the establishment of a new pact. After 
Turkey began to lead and play an active role in the Middle East, the U S. began to 
increase its relations with other states in the region. As a first step, the U S. signed an 
Economic and Technical Aid Convention with Pakistan on 28 December 1953 and on 
19 May 1954, an Agreement for Mutual Defense. Within this parallel, on 2 April 
1954, an agreement on Friendly Relations was signed. So these agreements became 
the basis o f the new Pact .**^
After Turkey concluded an agreement with Pakistan, Turkey this time 
commenced diplomatic initiatives to persuade the other Middle Eastern states to join 
the agreement, which was concluded with Pakistan. In order to establish a real pact in 
the region, the membership of the Arab states was necessary, otherwise such a pact 
could not really be established. At the end of 1954, Turkish and Iraqi bureaucrats 
exchanged visits. During the visits between Turkish and Iraqi bureaucrats, there was a 
positive atmosphere and in the meetings, the issues were based on an agreement 
signed between Britain and Egypt on the Suez issue. On 6 January 1955, Menderes 
visited Iraq and on 12 January a security agreement between Turkey and Iraq was 
signed. On 14 January, Menderes this time visited both Syria and Lebanon, but the 
two states rejected the idea o f collaboration. On the other hand, Egypt, Syria and 
Saudi Arabia started a campaign against the Turkish-Iraqi Defense Agreement. 
Despite these challenges, on 24 February 1955 Turkey and Iraq this time signed
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Mutual Assistance Agreement. Britain, Pakistan and Iran joined this agreement and by 
these accessions, the Baghdad Pact was established. As a result, Turkey, Iraq, Britain, 
Pakistan and Iran became the members of the Baghdad Pact and the U.S. acquired an 
“observer” status.^™
The aim o f the establishment o f the Baghdad Pact was to provide an 
anti-communist block in the Middle East. But Arabs were against Israel and anti- 
western. So Arabs reacted against the Pact; Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia 
collaborated to establish a counter organization, whereas Lebanon and Jordan 
remained neutral, The Baghdad Pact negatively affected Turkish-Arab relations. 
Turkish relations with the Arab States declined except with Iraq, but relations of 
Turkey with Egypt and Syria became strained.*’* When Turkey signed the Baghdad 
Pact, a declaration was also signed and its articles relating to military assistance in 
times o f crisis were to be valid for and specifically in the Palestinian conflict. Turkey 
tried to persuade other Arab States to join the pro-Western defense treaties in vain. 
As by being allies to such a pact, they would be considered as accepting Israel’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty.
According to article 5 of the Baghdad Pact, the future candidates to become a 
member o f the pact should be a member of the Arab League and be a recognized state 
by the members of the Pact. Although Israel was kept out o f the Pact, by this clause 
the Arab-Jewish conflict escalated. In 1956, when Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula, 
Turkey declared Israel as a major threat directed towards the Middle East peace and 
order. On 20 November 1956, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Tel-Aviv. 
Therefore, the level o f representation was reduced to the level o f “charge d ’affairs”.
170 Nachmani, 1987: 42.
62
Then it was considered that by these actions, Turkey intended to calm down the 
Arabs. Turkey thought that by this policy, it would be possible to strengthen the 
position o f the Baghdad Pact. But the balance o f power in the region changed and the 
relations between Israel and Turkey got worse.
Israel was concerned for Turkey itself in the Baghdad Pact, about Turkey’s 
opening to the Middle East. Weapons, which were delivered to Iraq were liable to fall 
into the hands o f the Kurdish insurgents in Turkey. So in case of Iraq’s weakness, the 
alliance would be worthless for Turkey. Therefore, Israel argued that it would be 
cheaper and safer in times of emergency to occupy Iraq rather than arming them and 
expecting from them to defend themselves against a communist enemy with the strong 
possibility that the weapons would fall into anti-western hands. Neither Iraq nor 
Pakistan was vigorously anti-communist and Turkey was unlikely therefore to gain a 
great deal from these two countries in that respect. On the contrary, Pakistan would 
enjoy taking the arms it received through its alliance with Turkey and directing them 
against India; Iraq would do likewise against Israel. In this manner, Turkey might find 
itself embroiled in a confrontation with India or with Israel. Finally, Israel was anxious 
about Turkish secular and pro-European character, which would be adversely affected 
by Ankara’s policies particularly with regard to its alliance with Iraq and Pakistan.*’^
Since Turkey was a member o f NATO, due to this legal link, Iraq was also but 
implicitly linked to NATO. But other Arab states were defending a pact, which had 
neutrality between East and West and consisted o f only the Arab states. Therefore, 
Iraq was under a pressure o f other Arab states and this pressure resulted with the Iraq
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Revolution on 14 July 1958. After the Iraqi revolution (14 July 1958), Iraq left the 
Baghdad Pact the same year and the Pact’s name was changed into Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO), which aimed to found the relations that were based on 
economic, cultural and technical mutual cooperation.
As a result, the Baghdad Pact damaged the interests of Turkey and became 
fmitless and Turkey’s regional relations were affected negatively as well as harming 
the western world’s interests in the region and attracted the Soviet threat. With the 
establishment o f the Pact, the alliance between the Arabs and the Soviet Union began, 
radical dialogues increased and Israel considered the Pact as a negative development.
Turkey was affected to become a member o f the Pact by excluding Israel, which 
led a decline in Turkish-Israeli relations.
3.1.3. The Peripheral Pact
In the summer o f 1958, Israel and Turkey entered into an alliance with an 
agreement for co-operation in the diplomatic, military and intelligence fields as well as 
in commerce and science, which came to be known as the “peripheral pact” . The pact 
included Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, Israel and even was extended to certain Christian 
parts o f Sudan. On 29-30 August 1958, Israel’s Prime Minister Ben Gurion and 
Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes reached to an understanding to establish a 
Peripheral Pact. This understanding stemmed from the need to take common action 
against the Soviet and Nasserist subversion applied to four o f the Middle Eastern 
countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq) combined with Israel’s obsessive efforts
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to break out o f its diplomatic isolation. This isolation had been recently exacerbated 
by Israel’s confrontation with the U.S. over the Suez War, These factors led both 
Israel and Turkey to overcome their respective inhibitions and mutual misgivings. 
With the Kassemite coup d'etat on 14 July 1958, the republic was proclaimed in 
Baghdad, Iraq. Maneuvers were conducted by 24 Soviet divisions near the Turkish 
border in order to rid Turkey and Israel o f their residual hesitations.” *
In the August 1958 agreement (Peripheral Pact), the Turks adopted the notion 
o f “complementary nations” . This concept would have a number o f beneficial effects 
when implemented; the provision o f Israeli know-how in laying an oil pipeline from 
Iran to Turkey, scientific cooperation in highly sensitive fields (especially through the 
meetings in Geneva), Israeli expertise would be employed in development of Turkish 
industry and agriculture. Israeli military equipment would be exported to Turkish 
armed forces. In return, it was agreed that Israel would enjoy the support of the 
Turkish Army, numbering hundreds of thousands o f troops. By the 1958 treaty, 
Turkey also undertook an assigranent, which prior to the Suez crisis o f 1956 had 
traditionally fallen to Israel. Following the Suez Crisis and worsening the U.S.-Israel 
relations, Turks would act on Israel’s behalf in Washington, in particular by asking the 
Pentagon to supply Israel arms. On top o f this, there should be frequent consultations, 
coordination between Turkish and Israeli diplomats accredited in various capitals, 
cooperation and mutual assistance at the UN (with the stress on the Cyprus issue), as
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well as agreement on joint military action on with regard to Aden, which lay on the 
route of the oil tankers, fell under the control of Nasser.’^ ®
In the realm o f foreign policy, Turkey and Israel shared the same concerns 
about certain Arab states. Because, Turkey and Israel were the only non-Arab, secular 
and democratic countries in the Middle East and the Middle East was also dominated 
by military dictatorships and theocratic regimes. The “periphery strategy” of Israel 
i.e., seeking alignment with Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia and supporting non-Muslim 
minorities, overlaps with Turkey’s wariness regarding Syria’s imperial dreams. Syrian 
borders with Turkey and Israel had always been in dispute since a long time. The 
Syrians have not forgiven Turkey for “ceding” Hatay in 1939, nor Israel for the 
annexation o f the Golan Heights in 1952. Compounding the situation, Turkey 
implicitly supported the Israeli annexation by abstaining for the UN Resolution that 
condemned Israel.*^’ After 1957, Turkey and Israel came closer to each other and the 
two states signed in secrecy a Peripheral Pact. Israel’s aim was to establish better 
relations with states, which were out of the Arab area and these were Turkey, Iran 
and Ethiopia. But this pact did not last long and became ineffective.
By the 1958 alliance, according to Israel, Turkey existed in the Middle East in 
a friendly and balancing character, prevented Israel to face the Russian army through 
Syria and led to the realization o f Ben-Gurion’s strategy. This strategy foresaw to 
balance the enmity o f Arabs that live like in the internal part o f the moon shape in the
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Middle East with Turkish friendship, which existed in the external part o f the shape of 
the region.'^®
As mentioned above, Turkish-Israeli relations during the 1950s developed in 
social, commercial and military fields. But the military cooperation was carried out 
covertly and Turkey and Israel exchanged military information. Israeli construction 
firm Sole! Boneh, which had constructed all kinds o f buildings for the State o f Israel 
in the strategic areas, also constructed airports in Turkey as a firm with confidential 
references, within the frame of Joint NATO Defence Organisation. It was claimed that 
at the same time this collaboration meant an alliance agreement between Israel, 
Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia and the U S. supported the Peripheral Pact. Although the 
Arab states accused Turkey o f signing a military agreement with Israel, Turkey kept 
on rejecting this accusation.
The common denominator o f the members of the Peripheral Pact (1958) was 
having conflict with the Arab neighbors and being under the threat o f the Soviet 
invasion. Turkey had preponderence because o f being located in the center of the 
Arab states that surrounded Israel and geographically located at the “external point” 
o f the region.**“ Israel’s security strategy in the Middle East was based on an 
“outflank” strategy (to siege the enemy by going back) and in this pact, Israel decided 
to give their organizational authority to the Israeli Military Intelligence; AMAN (Agaf 
Ha Medi 7/ Israeli Armament Forces’ Unit o f Intelligence) and in this collaboration 
Turkey was responsible for intervening Syrian and Lebanon areas.*** In order to apply 
this strategy, Israel began to collaborate with Iran’s Shah regime and prevented the
178
179
180
Tavla§, 1994: 5.
Duman, 1995: 169. 
Lukacks-Battah, 1998: 23.
67
military coup against the Ethiopian government and began to give military training to 
the new Ethiopian army.
At the beginning, Turkey considered the idea o f cooperation with Israel very 
objectively in order not to add any more problems to Islamic states’ accusations of 
Turkey as collaborating with the imperialist members to NATO. But the US realized 
that, without Turkish participation, a security pact could not become a real one. 
Therefore, the US kept encouraging Turkey to establish cooperation with the U S. in 
order to establish a security pact in the Middle East. The basis o f Turkish timidity 
towards improving relations with Israel was mainly due to the new conflicts that 
emerged in the Middle East and the abolishment o f some o f the old administrations. 
An internal war had broken out in Lebanon, the monarchy in Iraq was abolished, 
under the influence of Nasser the Jordanian regime was also abolished and lastly 
during Egyptian president’s visit to Damascus the Egyptian president declared that 
Egypt would support the revolutionary administration in Iraq.
After Turkey’s decision o f establishing cooperation with Israel, on August 
1957, Israel appointed Eliahu Sasson (the chief o f the Middle East unit in MOSSAD) 
(in Hebrew language “Le Biyyun U ’Let Afkidim Meyuhadim”- Unit o f Espionage and 
Special Tasks) a very experienced intelligence staff, to Ankara as an ambassador in 
order to persuade Turkey to establish closer ties with Israel. After Sasson’s 
appointment, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Sasson had a 
meeting and worked on collaborative issues. Turkey demanded to keep their
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collaboration as a “secret” and Israel accepted this demand. But Turkey was still 
hesitating to begin to collaborate.**^
On December 1957, when Sasson with a “special agent status” visited 
Turkey’s Prime Minister Adnan Menderes before his assignment to Ankara as an 
Israeli Ambassador, they discussed the issue of collaboration in matters o f intelligence 
and decided to meet seven months later with both states’ intelligence staffs. The 
meeting took place in Ankara and led by Turkish Intelligence Organizations’ (MİT) 
chieftain Hüseyin Avni Göktürk and the chieftain o f MOSS AD Reuven Shiolah. Israel 
was decisive in establishing a “security trident” in the region and demanded the 
assistance o f the US for persuading Turkey. After discussions between Washington 
and Ankara, the Turkish government was persuaded to collaborate with Israel.**^ On 
28 August 1958, the Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion with the Israeli Minister o f 
Foreign Affairs Golda Meir, with the councellor o f the Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres 
and the chief o f the General Staff Zui Zur paid a visit to the Turkish Prime Minister 
Adnan Menderes. In order to keep this visit’s aim secret, especially fi'om the Islamic 
World the visit was declared to the public to be a force majeure landing to Ankara 
due to an “incident” in the motor o f the ELAL airplane. In the meeting, economic, 
political and the military issues were discussed. But the decision of regularly 
exchanging intelligence was kept secret.**'*
According to a CIA report, extracted from an “Israel’s Secret Service and 
Foreign Intelligence” report, an agreement among MOSSAD, MİT and Iran’s Secret 
Service (SAVAK) was concluded and called as a trident cooperation period.
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According to this report, Israel would follow the activities o f the Soviet Union over 
Turkey and in return, Turkey would follow the activities of the Arab states; especially 
Syria. With this agreement, Israel promised to give “technical aid” on educating 
Turkish intelligence staff, the counter-intelligence and the efficiency of 
communicational devices. According to the Trident Agreement, twice a year the 
chiefs o f the intelligence services would join the meeting and make assessments on the 
intelligence issues. ***The agreement was based on the following activities o f the 
Soviet agents in these countries. According to the agreement, the collected 
information about the attitudes o f Syrian Arab regime towards Israel would be shared 
with MOSSAD. The most important fact of the agreement between Turkey and Israel 
was to promise to share the same intelligence that they gave to Iran.'** Another 
important factor o f the agreement was the occasion o f necessity; the parties to the 
i^eem ent would provide the necessary easiness to the fnendly intelligence 
organizations. For example, while Israel was following the developments in Sudan in 
September 1955, Israeli officials met Sudanese opposition leader (Umma Party) in 
Turkey.'*’
3.2. The Suez Crisis
After the year 1949, Egypt began to control the ships that were passing 
through the Suez Canal in order to find out if they were transporting goods to Israel
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or not. With these controls Egypt increased its control over the canal and in 1954 
decided to ban the ships to transport food to Israel. Egypt, in the same year, seized 
one o f the Israeli ships. Upon this, Israel applied to the U.N. Security Council. Most 
o f the members declared that Egypt violated the terms o f Istanbul Agreement (1888) 
which had foreseen the free transportation through the canal. The members also 
declared that Egypt had no right to investigate the ships. On the other hand, during 
these years Egypt demanded credit from the Western States to construct the Aswan 
Dam. At first, Britain and the U S. accepted the Egyptian demand, but when they had 
realized that Egypt was also waiting the reply o f the Soviet Union for financial 
support and they declined their promise on 19-20 July 1956. Another reason o f the 
withdrawal of this aid was Egypt’s recognition of People’s Republic o f China, on May 
1956. Upon this political development, the U S. public opinion turned against Egypt. 
On 26 July 1956, the U S. Senate rejected to give loan to Egypt and then Egypt, the 
same day, declared the nationalisation o f the Suez Canal. It was declared formally that 
the aim o f the nationalization was to find the necessary financial support for the 
construction of the Aswan Dam.
Egypt declared that the passage through the canal would be conducted in 
accordance with Istanbul Agreement o f 1888, and the necessary reparations to the 
British and French companies, which were managing the canal, would be paid. But the 
problems were not solved and France, Britain and Israel decided to prepare a joint 
plan to attack to Egypt. According to the plan Israel would attack as a first step and 
then call Britain and France in order to establish a cease-fire. From both states, Britain 
and France would demand to withdraw their forces 16 km. back from the Canal.
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Egypt would most probably reject this demand and then Britain and France would 
intervene and invade the Canal.'**
On 25 October 1956, in order to maintain collective defence against any 
possible British, French and Israeli attacks the Joint Command was established among 
Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Due to this development, Israel began a campaign and when 
the Soviet Union began to turn its attention towards the riots in Hungary, Israel found 
an opportunity to attack Egypt and placed the Sinai Peninsula under its control. 
Parallel to this plan, when Nasser rejected France and Britain’s demands of 
intervening and invading the Canal, Britain and France joined to the military action. 
Egypt sank the ships and therefore the Canal was blocked to navigation. But the aim 
of Britain and France was to keep the canal open to navigation. On the other hand, 
the Soviet Union was against this attack and sent a message to Israel, France and 
Britain demanding to end the armed hostilities immediately. The Soviet Union also 
sent a message to the U S. and proposed the establishment o f a joint force with the 
U S. in order to give an end to the conflict. But this proposal was rejected by the U S. 
and the U S. this time threatened the Soviet Union that if the Soviet Union would 
send its military forces to Egypt, the U S. would apply counter-measures to the Soviet 
Union. The U S. not only just criticised the Soviet Union, but also France and Britain 
for intervening to the crisis. In spite of the fact that both France and Britain were 
NATO members, they secretly commenced to organize an operation and they had 
even hidden this from the U S. and also from the other allies. As a result, the U S. 
decided to end sending military and economic aid to Israel and demanded from France 
and Britain to withdraw their forces from Egypt. In March 1957, both states withdrew
188 Gdnlubol-Ulman, 1966: 278-280.
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their forces from the region and the Canal was opened to navigation. Consequently, 
it was seen that Egypt was not militarily successful, but the allies politicaly proved 
their strength in the Middle East.
The U.S. wanted to solve this conflict in the U N. Ehie to this demand, twenty 
four states which were using the Canal frequently were invited to the meeting of 16 
August 1956 in London. Turkey was also among the invited states. Egypt and Greece 
did not participate in the meeting. The U.S. Minister o f Foreign Affairs Mr. Dulles 
declared their plan to solve this conflict. According to the U.S. plan, Egypt should 
have sovereign rights over the Canal while free navigation through the Canal should 
be ensured. Suez Canal should be administered by an international administration 
consisting of the representatives o f Egypt and other regional powers. This plan was 
supported by Turkey but rejected by Egypt. On the other hand, due to its non 
participation to the meeting, Greece gained the sympathy of the Arab States. 
Although Turkey accepted the U.S. plan, Turkey with Pakistan, Iran and Ethiopia 
recommended an ammendment to this plan in which they underlined the condition of 
“not violating the sovereign rights o f Egypt in the Canal” . The U.S. accepted the 
amendment proposal o f Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Ethiopia. But Egypt declared that, 
when Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal would be accepted and the idea of leaving 
the control of the Canal under an international administration would be given up, 
Egypt would be ready to guarantee the free navigation o f states through the Canal. 
On 19-22 September, the Second London Conference convened in order to discuss 
the status o f the Suez Canal. Among the states which were using the Suez Canal, a 
union was established. The union had eighteen members which were; Australia,
189 Duman, 1995: 227-228.
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Denmark, Turkey, Ethiopia, France, Federal Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Iran, Spain, Sweden, Britain and the U.S/^* On 
October 1956, Turkey condemned Israel for attacking Egypt and also condemned 
Britain and France for supporting this agression.
After Britain and France declared a cease-fire on 6 November 1956, the 
Baghdad Pact convened on 7 November in Tehran in order to assess the crisis. Britain 
was not invited to this meeting and at the end of the meeting Israel was condemned by 
the members o f the Pact, but on the other hand, Britain and France were not 
condemned. The members of this Pact demanded from France and Britain to 
withdraw their forces from the Canal. Again on 18-20 November, the muslim 
members o f the Baghdad Pact convened in Baghdad and discussed the possible 
measures to maintain peace and security in the Middle East. At the end o f the 
meeting, the members decided to improve relations in the region not only among the 
Muslim states, but also among the other regional states. The members also agreed on 
the fact that, Israel constituted an important threat to the Middle East peace and the 
members began to put pressure on Turkey in order to give an end to its diplomatic 
relations with Israel.
Turkey was in a very difficult status during the Suez Crisis in the Middle East. 
Turkey on one hand was a NATO member and had a Western tendency in its policies 
and on the other hand began to lose its credibility among the Arab States. At the 
beginning o f this crisis, Turkey pursued the western policy, but after a while
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condemned the aggression to E g y p t . D u r i n g  the crisis, there were some challenges 
to the Turkish-Israeli relations, as well as among the regional powers. During the war, 
Nasser accused Iraq of collaborating with Israel (in connection with the Baghdad 
Pact) and also accused Turkey of establishing good relations with Israel, but Iraq 
never applied pressure over Turkey regarding its policies towards Israel. Iraq 
preferred to reject the Egyptian accusations.'^“* Despite Turkey’s new policy towards 
Israel, she faced criticism from the Arab States due to its western tendency. On 22 
November 1956, Turkey withdrew its ambassador in Israel H E. Şevket İstinyeli, to 
Ankara and Israel’s ambassador in Ankara returned back to Israel. With this mutual 
diplomatic actions the mutual representation at the ambassador’s level was reduced to 
the level o f “charge d'affaires”. On 26 November 1956, the Turkish Ambassador 
Ş . istinyeli visited the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared them that;
“In order to strengthen the Baghdad Pact, the decision o f reducing the 
level o f diplomatic representation level is taken by my government. This 
diplomatic action should not be interpreted as a hostile action against the 
State o f Israel.”
By reducing the diplomatic representation level, Turkey aimed to gain the 
support o f the Arab States. Turkish policy became ineffective among the Arab States 
by the statement o f the Turkish Ambassador, which was disclosed by some sources. 
So, these developments led to the decline o f the Baghdad Pact. Because Turkey 
supported the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, applied contradictory policies towards 
Syria in 1957 and Iraq in 1958 and let the U  S. use the NATO base in Adana during 
the Lebanon crisis in 1958, Turkey lost the Arab support and faced the reactions of
193 Aras, 1997: 133.
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these states. This led Turkey to turn towards Israel and as mentioned above, the 
Peripheral Pact was signed between Turkey and Israel due to these developments.
So at the end o f the crisis, Israel expected diplomatic support from Turkey. Within the 
framework o f cooperation, Turkey would support Israel during the provision o f 
weapons from the U S. and Israeli diplomats would act similarly especially on the 
Cyprus issue in the U.N. with Turkish diplomats.
Following the Suez Crisis, Turkey’s relations with Syria and Egypt got worse 
and Syria became a close ally o f the Soviet Union. During the Suez Crisis, the 
Baghdad Pact was the most important factor in the determination o f Turkey’s foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. So, the relations between Turkey and Israel were 
greatly affected by the other challenges to its foreign policy. On the other hand, at the 
end o f the crisis, the Soviet Union began to support Egypt. With this support, the 
Soviet Union gained the sympathy o f the Arab States.
At the end o f the Suez Crisis in 1956, there were some challenges in the 
Middle East and with the withdrawal o f Britain and France at the end of the war, the 
U S. became effective in the region and the Soviet Union was against the U S ’ 
gaining power in the region. Hence, Soviet Union increased its activities in the region 
as a counter measure. Due to the rivalry o f the two states in the Middle East and 
specifically on the Palestinian conflict, the influence o f both states increased.*^’
On 5 January 1957, the U S. President Eisenhower made a declaration on the 
Middle East, in order to guide the Middle Eastern Countries to protect their
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independence and to lay down the basis o f cooperation between the states and assist 
them. The declaration consisted o f three steps:
a. The U.S. should have the authority to cooperate with all states which 
would demand or be ready to give military aid and comply with 
cooperation programme for the Middle East and with the states which 
would need and demand aid.
b. When one or more o f the regional states faced an attack by any of the 
communist states and demanded aid for a counter-attack or to protect its 
sovereignty and freedom, if it deemed necessary, the U.S. should have the 
right to use its armed forces.
c. According to the Mutual Security Act, between the years 1958-1959, in 
order to provide economic and military aid to the Middle East, the 
management authority o f 200 million US dollars aid was given to the US
198government.
After Eisenhower’s above declaration, this declaration was called as the 
“Eisenhower Doctrine” and accepted in the Senate on 9 March 1957. Egypt, Syria 
and Saudi Arabia announced that they were against this doctrine. But after a while, 
Saudi Arabia accepted this doctrine. Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Pakistan were among 
the first supporters and later, Israel, Libya, Tunusia, Morocco and Afghanistan 
became the other supporters o f this doctrine. During this period, Turkey began to 
cooperate more with the West and the Turkish Prime Minister AMenderes 
considered the U.S. as a unique power against the Soviet Union. With the approval o f
198 Gonlubol-Ulman, 1993; 288.
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the Eisenhower Doctrine, Britain lost most o f its influence in the region and the U S. 
became one o f the important and influencial states in the Middle East .*’^
Gdnlvibol-Ulman, 1993: 289.
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CHAPTER 4
TURKISH ISRAELI RELATIONS FROM THE 1960s UP TO 1980s
4.1. The Cyprus Issue
The roots o f the Cyprus conflict can be traced back to the 16th century, but as 
our theme is Turkish-Israeli relations between 1948 till 1980s, I would like to briefly 
review the Cyprus issue from 1950s onward. The control of Cyprus was taken over 
from the Venetians by the Ottomans at 1571. Since that date Cyprus was under 
Ottoman rule untill the end of the Russian War (1877-1878) when Ottomans were 
defeated on 3 March 1878 and the Ottoman Empire had to sign the the St. Sophia 
(Ayestefanos) Agreement on 23 May 1878. On 4 June 1878, an agreement was signed 
between the Ottoman Empire and Britain. With this agreement, the authority to 
govern the island was left to Britain. In 24 July 1923 with the Laussanne Agreement, 
the control of Cyprus was given to Britain.
Cyprus was the only place under the full control o f Britain in the Middle East. 
After the Second World War, Greeks living in Cyprus began demonstrations against 
the British rule. Greece began to interfere in Cyprus and encouraged armed struggles 
in order to annex the island.^”® At the early stages, the Turkish government considered 
the issue as Britain’s problem and was not concerned with it. But, the Turkish press 
had taken it up as a national issue. In 1950, the main problem o f Turkey, and Greece 
was to enter into the western alliance. Also as Turkey gave preeminence to the
Enosis is the union of Cyprus with Greece. Armaoğlu, 1964: 821.
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continuation o f the Baghdad Pact and tried to ignore the events which would ruin the 
pact, both states abstained from a strife on the Cyprus issue. From the Turkish 
perspective, the main threat was communism. Therefore, Turkey wanted to 
collaborate with Greece in order to prevent any possible attack o f the Soviet Union. 
The main reason bringing these two old enemies together was not being a NATO 
member and their common anxiety about the Soviet threat. Therefore, despite Greek 
demonstrations in the island, the Cyprus issue did not consist a conflict between 
Turkey and Greece at that time. After Papagos came to power in Greece in 1953, the 
Greek government began to play an active role in the island. From May 1954 upto 22 
August, Greece demanded to take over the rule o f Cyprus from Britain. If Britain 
would not give up its authority on the island, Greece would take the issue to the 
United Nations and the issue would gain an international status.
On 16 August 1954, with the demand o f “self-determination” for Cyprus, 
Greece applied to the United Nations and the issue was incorporated into the agenda 
of the United Nations (U N.) on 24 August 1954. In September 1954, the U N . 
negotiated this issue, but failed to recommend any decision on this subject. According 
to Menderes, the negotiations over Cyprus were ended with this decision o f the U N. 
But, Greeks escalated their terrorist activities in the island, which disturbed Britain. 
The violence in the island started to attract the attention of the international fora and 
Turkey due to these events started to get involved with the Cyprus issue. Therefore, it 
can be claimed that the Turkish government began to get seriously involved in the 
Cyprus issue, after the summer o f 1955.^ ®*
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As a result o f violent riots, which broke up in the island, the British 
government called Turkey and Greece again to a conference in London on 29 August 
1955. But the parties could not reach to any consensus as Turkey demanded keeping 
the status-quo, Greece advocated self determination and Britain wanted to give an 
autonomous status to the island. At the London Conference, Turkey assigned its 
sovereign rights on Cyprus to Britain. Cyprus was under Turkish rule for a long time, 
but never ruled by Greece. Until the First World War, the majority o f the population 
consisted o f Turks; 60 percent o f registered lands were owned by Turks, also the 
island was strategically very important for Turkey as well as Greece. Although under 
these circumtances, Turkish government had abstained from her rights in favour o f 
Britain, but, if Britain would not accept these rights, Cyprus would belong to Turkey. 
Greece was surprised with Turkey’s assignment. According to the Report of Radcliff 
on 19 December 1956, the British Government accepted the partition o f the island as 
a solution to the conflict, after the report that the Turkish government had begun to 
accept partition as a solution, while Greece defended the application o f “self- 
determination” principle to the island. So, each one o f the three states had different 
approaches to this issue. On 6 September, bombs began to explode mostly in Istanbul 
and at the house of Atatürk in Selonica, and consequently riots against Greeks broke 
out in Ankara and İzmir.^®  ^ So the London Conference was influenced by the 6-7 
September events and the conference ended. After the conference, the clashes 
between Turks and Greeks took place in Cyprus and violence increased.
At the end o f the year 1957, Britain offered to establish a regime of 
partnership on the island. But this suggestion was rejected by Turkey and Greece, and
202 Armaoğlu, 1973: 165-169.
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Greece kept on taking the Cyprus issue to the United Nations. In September and 
December 1957, Greece presented draft resolutions to the U N. in which Greece 
declared that the human rights were violated in Cyprus by the British Colonial 
Administration. In 5 December and 14 December 1957, when the Greek draft 
resolution was voted, Greece was o f course in favour o f it while Turkey and the 
United Kingdom rejected it. Israel and the U S . abstained from the voting o f the draft 
resolution.^®^ The U N. refrained from imposing any solution to the conflict, but 
recommended to solve the conflict through negotiations among Turkey, Britain and 
Greece. In 1958, violence increased on the island and Turkish-Greek and Greek- 
British relations became tense. So NATO’s right flank o f the Eastern Mediterranean 
was affected from these conflicts. Consequently, under the pressure o f NATO and the 
U.S., Turkey and Greece began bilateral negotiations. On 5-11 February 1959 in 
Zurich, both states’ prime ministers decided to establish the Republic o f Cyprus 
(which would be a binational state and based on the existence o f two ethnic 
communities)^”* and agreed on the principles o f a constitution to ensure the right o f 
independence and existence o f Turkish Cypriot community and other related matters. 
These were incorporated into agreements and these agreements were signed by the 
representatives o f Turkey, Greece, Britain, Turkish Cypriot Community and Greek 
Cypriot Community.
On 19 February 1959, another conference convened in London, and at the end 
of the conference the decision that was taken at Zurich was accepted. So Zurich and 
London Agreements established organic ties and relations between Britain, Turkey, 
Greece and the independent State o f Cyprus. With the Guarantee Agreement, Britain,
For more details, see: Yearbook of the U.N., 1957: 76.
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Greece and Turkey ensured the right o f freedom, territorial integrity, security and the 
main principles o f the Constitution and safeguarded the interests o f the guarantor 
powers. With this agreement, the Republic o f Cyprus guaranteed to protect its 
recognized constitutional rights. But, if a threat arises against the guaranteed rights 
and principles and if the principles of the agreement would be violated, Greece, 
Britain and Turkey would consult each other in order to take the necessary actions.
If the parties could not agree on taking possible common actions or continue to 
violate the constitutional order, each o f the three states would have the right to 
intervene. According to the Alliance Agreement, Greece would deploy 950 and 
Turkey would have a right to deploy 650 military personnel on the island. Also 
according to these agreements enosis or partition o f the Republic o f Cyprus was 
forbidden.
On 16 August 1960 with the provisions o f 1960 Treaties of Nicosia, the 
Republic o f Cyprus was officially established which would last until 21 December 
1963 and entitled Turkey with the right to intervene to the island.^®’ At the U.N., 
Turkey faced difficulties in finding support for the Cyprus issue. Therefore, Turkey 
begun to reassess its relations with the West. After the Greek attacks (on 21 
December 1963), the future of Cyprus and the Turks living in Cyprus became the 
major factor in Turkish foreign policy. Under the rule o f Makarios in Cyprus, on 
December 1963, attacks were redirected towards the Turks.^”* Firstly, in compliance 
with the agreement, Turkey decided to ask from the Cyprus government to end the
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hostilities. (According to the agreement, first the parties of the conflict were to try to 
take joint peaceful actions). But, when Turkish attempts for peaceful solution were 
unsuccessful, on 25 December 1963, Turkey decided to intervene and Turkish air 
forces landed on the island. In order to maintain peace, on 27 December, under the 
British Command a trident force was established and on 13-31 January 1964, the 
London Conference convened. But at the end, the parties could not reach to any 
solution. NATO forces were assigned to protect security and peace on the island, but 
the Cyprus government objected to the deployment o f NATO forces on the island. 
Therefore, Turkey decided to take the conflict to the U N.
With the decision o f the U N. Security Council on 4 March 1964, the U N. 
Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was assigned to maintain peace and 
security in Cyprus. UNFICYP was financially supported by Cyprus, Turkey, Greece 
and Israel as well as other states.^" But the U N. Peace Force was unsuccessful in 
preventing the armed conflicts. So with the continuation o f strife, Turkey realized that 
diplomatic initiatives were all in vain and on June 1964 decided to intervene the island 
unilaterally. After this decision o f Turkey, the U S. President (5 June 1964) Lyndon 
Johnson sent a letter to the Prime Minister İnönü and recommended to hold back 
intervention to Cyprus and invited İnönü to the U S. When this letter was received, 
Turkey gave up its decision to intervene. After Inönü’s visit to the U S. at the end of 
June, a joint declaration was accepted in which both states agreed on solving the
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Cyprus issue by multilateral negotiations (in reference to the validity o f the 
agreements).^'^
With the involvement of the U S. in the Cyprus issue, negotiations among the 
concerned parties began in Geneva on 20 July 1964. But the attacks of Greeks to the 
Turks in Cyprus continued, and on 8-9 August 1964, Turkish air forces bombed the 
miUtary basis at Cyprus. Just after this, the Security Council called for a cease-fire and 
Turkey, acting in compliance with the resolution, gave an end to its operations on the 
island. During this period, the relations between Turkey and the West were stretched, 
especially with the U  S. The challenges in Turkish-American relations were mainly 
related with the Lyndon Johnson letter.
With Johnson’s letter, it was declared that in case of an intervention to 
Cyprus, Turkey was not permitted to use the U S. military ammunitions and it was 
also emphasized that as a result o f military intervention to Cyprus if a Soviet attack 
occured, NATO might not defend Turkey.^*'* So, this declaration caused crisis in 
Turkish-American relations, anxiety towards NATO and the U S. was arose and 
decreased Western States’ credibility in the Turkish opinion.
Armaoğlu, 1973: 270.
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On 18 December 1965 at the U N. General Council, Political Commission, 
members voted about the Cyprus issue. At this voting, it was decided that foreign 
intervention (Turkey) to the island would be unacceptable and the decision was 
against the articles o f 1960 Guarantee Agreement. The voting was concluded by 47 
votes in favour of the decision, 6 against and 54 abstantions.^*^ So it can be said that, 
Cyprus issue has been one o f the determinants o f the Turkish Foreign Policy. On this 
issue, Turkey was isolated by NATO members and especially by the U S. (even when 
it had a right to intervene). Then, Turkey began to question its foreign policy towards 
the West and the U S. When the idea of the self governing system for Cyprus was 
supported on 29 May 1964 in Algeria in the Council o f Asia-Africa, Turkey was also 
isolated by Third World countries due to its Western oriented foreign policy 
Cyprus issue indicated Turkey’s loneliness in the international fora. As a result of 
these events, Turkey began to make the necessary amendments in its foreign policy.
In 1965, Turkish Foreign Policy was reconsidered under the leadership of 
Foreign Minister Hasan Esat Işık. Then, Turkish foreign policy was rearranged and 
acquired a multi-dimensional perspective. With this policy the effectiveness o f the 
U.S. on Turkey did not change, but Turkey gave priority to its interests and needs and 
decided that interests o f Turkey should not necessarily have to overlap with the U.S. 
Turkish policy pursued in the Middle East especially towards Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
Soviet Union, the People’s Republic o f China and Africa were altered. Turkish 
multidimensional foreign policy was crystallized by a great increase in oil prices in 
1973 and the crisis in Cyprus. There were three new objectives. First one was to 
become a member and an active player o f the Organization of the Islamic Conference
215 Gönlübol-Ülman, 1966: 143.
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(OIC). Second, was increasing the economic relations with the Arab States and third, 
to refuse to join to the U S. led diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran and to 
adopt an increasingly critical stance towards Israel.^*’
After the Cyprus crisis, Turkey decided to establish closer relations with the 
Soviet Union and rearranged its security policy especially by basing its policy on 
prioritizing the provision o f weapons programme, which would let Turkey to invade 
the island in case o f necessity. On 14 January 1965, when the U S. declared that 
Turkey should refrain from participating in the Multilateral Forces (MLF) and 
withdraw its eleven officers which were sent in 1964 from the destroyer “Claude 
Ricketts” (staffed by seven NATO nations), Moscow revised its pro-Makarios 
attitude on the Cyprus issue. Then, the Soviet Union accepted the idea o f “two 
separate communities” in Cyprus and supported “a federative” administration for the 
Island in parallel with the Turkish policy.^** Turkey also decided to establish better 
relations with the Arab States but on the other hand, had to balance its good relations 
with Israel.
In the Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey preferred not to intervene and to keep in 
balance its relations with both the Arab States and Israel. Therefore, Turkey refrained 
from being always on the side o f the West and from leading and joining separatist 
pacts in the region.^*^ In the middle o f 1960s, Turkey and the Arab States became 
closer and in order to gain support for Turkish Cypriots, in 1969 Turkey joined the 
Organisation o f Islamic Conference in an observer status. With Turkey’s membership 
to the Organisation o f Islamic Conference, Turkey began to benefit from its
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membership and through the Turkish membership, the importance o f the conference in 
western eyes were risen. On the other hand, the Arab States began to get interested in 
the muslim Turkish minority in Bulgaria and Turkish Cypriots.^^® The Cyprus issue 
and the need o f diplomatic support in international arena led Turkey to improve its 
relations with the Arab States. Therefore during the Cyprus issue, Turkey tried to 
strengthen its political and economic relations with the Arab States. But neither 
Turkey nor the Arab States reached to a consensus or eliminated the differences 
between thern.^^*
During Greece-Turkish conflicts on the Cyprus issue, generally Israel 
remained neutral. But pro-Turkish status was predominant in Israeli policies and in 
Israeli-Greek relations, Israel in general did not have any biased approach against 
Greece. There were for and against opinions for supporting enosis. Supporting 
approaches of enosis were; “Israeli traditional acknowledgement o f the right o f self 
determination” and “Israeli moral debt” to many o f the island’s inhabitants who aided 
immigration o f Jews into Palestine during the rule o f the British Mandate. Between 
for and against arguments, Israel had to balance its relations. They were supporting 
Turkish demand o f maintaining the status-quo in the island, but on the other hand the 
relations with Greece should not burden Israel excessively.^^^
The Greek idea of enosis in Cyprus was based on communism and was the 
dominant ideology in the Greek Cypriot part. Therefore, Israel refrained from 
showing to Turkey that Israel was supporting this idea and some o f the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry officials and diplomats supported the Turkish side. According to them.
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Turkey had good relations with Israel and they were keeping their promises in order 
not to alienate the possible Arab votes in the UN for Greece on the Cyprus issue. 
Greece promised to recognize Israel and in this parallel, Israel would support Greece 
in the Cyprus issue. But as the promise was not realized until the end o f the Cyprus 
crisis, Israel reassessed which country it would support and decided to support 
Turkey in 1960s, as it would lose nothing by anti Greek policy while the reversal 
could harm the deep rooted Israeli-Turkish relations. Despite Israel’s decision to 
support Turkey in Cyprus issue, Israeli attempts remained limited.
In order to change the image o f Turkey on global media in the Cyprus issue, 
Turkey requested assistance from Israel; Israel could help Turkey especially through 
its powerful lobby in the U.S. and through the U.S. press. Thus, with Israel’s 
assistance, Turkey would be recognized in international financial markets and could 
maintain support for the recognition o f Cyprus. In response, Israel promised to 
support Turkey through its press and to provide assistance through loans, which 
would be provided by the private U.S. bankers Also Israeli diplomats from Ankara, 
Nicosia and Athens reported to Israel to support and give assistance to the Turkish 
side.^ *^* But during this period, Turkey tried to hide its relations with Israel from the 
public in order to keep in balance and develop its relations with the Arab States.
In general it can be said that in maintaining international support, Turkish 
Cypriots always faced difficulties and even the establishment o f the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus (T.R.N.C.) did not change this pattern. At the beginning, the 
Arab States declared that they could possibly recognize T.R.N.C., but not the new
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state (The Republic o f Cyprus). Turkish Cypriots aimed to proclaim a federal state in 
a state joint with the Greek Cypriots. But the aim o f Turkish Cypriots was prevented 
by the Greek Cypriots. In order to solve the conflict, Turkish Cypriot community 
needed to maintain the same political status with the Greek Cypriots and therefore 
should be recognized internationally. The Arab States could not recognize T.R.N.C. 
and the reasons was firstly; the existence o f different threats for Turkey and the Arab 
States. Secondly Turkey’s geostrategic location and Turkey’s active and important 
political role in the Middle East. Thirdly Turkey did not interfere any states, but some 
of the Middle East States interfered in Turkish domestic politics and its security 
policy. Turkey’s main principle o f secularism was misunderstood by the Arab States 
and the Iranians and they misinterpreted secularism as rejecting or alienating Islam. 
Lastly, Turkey’s alliance with the Western States disturbed the interests of the Arab 
States and Iranians.“ * Due to these reasons, as mentioned above, close relations 
between Turkey and the Arab States remained temporary and limited.
As a reaction to Greece, the Turkish Cypriots established a Turkish Federative 
State of Cyprus in 1975 and Turkey supported bicommual, bizonal and federal state in 
Cyprus. In the same year, Turkey decided to give the equal level o f representation of 
Rauf Denkta§, the President o f the Turkish Federative State o f Cyprus at the meetings 
of the Islamic Conference. So the Turkish Federative State o f Cyprus acquired the 
observer status in the Islamic Conference and the conference adopted a resolution 
which gave an equal status to Turkish Cypriots as same as the Greek Cypriots in 
international forums.“  ^ But in 1974, bi-communal negotiations broke out in Cyprus 
and coup d ’etat took place against the Cypriot government. Then Turkish military
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intervened into Cyprus in order to pave the way for a new constitutional order, to 
protect the Turkish Community and to divide the island into two zones.^^’ But Turkey 
neither maintained the western support nor the Third World support. The third world 
states, which were mostly composed o f Islamic States refrained from supporting 
Turkish status politically. Because from the third world states’ point of view, Turkey 
was an ally o f the Western States and therefore served to the western interests. This 
perspective o f the Islamic States changed with the U S. arms embargo of July 1975 to 
Turkey.^ *^
4.2. The Arab- Israeli Wars (1967- 1973)
4.2.1. Six-Day War (1967)
Tension between Israel and Syria had increased when Syria was involved in 
sabotages directed to the borders of Israel. As an outcome o f Nasser’s policies. Six 
Day War broke out in 1967. So in June 1967, between Israel and the Arab nations o f 
Egypt, Jordan and Syria which were aided by Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and 
Algeria an armed conflict occured. When Egypt blockaded the Gulf o f Aqaba which 
was an important transportation route for Israeli shipping, Israel regarded it as an act 
of aggression. On 5 June 1967, Israel led a massive, preemptive strike and Israeli 
forces moved quickly to occupy the Gaza Strip and push into the Sinai Peninsula. At 
the same time Israelis fought with Jordanians in Old Jerusalem and advanced into 
Syria. On 10 June, the entire Sinai Peninsula, all Jordanian territory o f the west o f the
Yavuz; Khan, 1992: 8-9.
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Jordan River and the strategic Golan Heights of Syria were all under the control o f 
Israel.^^^ As a result o f the war, Israel gained the Western Sharia, Gazze Strip, Golan 
Heights and whole o f the Jerusalem. So Israel invaded whole o f the Palestine and by 
the end of the war, the Palestinian conflict gained a new dimension. Before the war, 
the Arab states had lost their interests towards the Palestinian conflict, but by the end 
of the war their attention was turned towards the lost lands o f the Arab states
On 28 June 1967, Israel declared the annexation of Jerusalem but the UN rejected 
this declaration. As a result o f the Six-Day War, the Arab-Israel conflict was brought 
to the UN and on 22 November 1967 the US (which was supporting Israel) and the 
Soviet Union (which was supporting the Arab States) reached a consensus in 
accepting the UN Resolution o f 242.^ *^^  According to the resolution, Israel would 
withdraw its forces from the invaded lands and sovereignty and national integrity of 
all o f the regional states should be recognized. Also, the refugee problem should be 
solved and free transportation through the canals should be guaranteed. Because o f 
opposing views and interests o f the parties to the conflict, the parties could not reache 
a consensus.
As a result o f the Six Day War and the UN Resolution 242, Palestinian Arabs 
realized that they could not ignore the existence o f Israel anymore, but on the other 
hand kept on believing in the necessity of rescuing Gaza and Western Sharia from 
Israel. So this new challenge for Palestinian Arabs would play an important role on 
future Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements. The defeat o f the Palestinians at the end 
of the 1967 war had also great impact on Palestinians and led to an increase in
“Six Day War”, 1994; 1.
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terrorism.^^* On the other hand, Turkey supported the UN Resolution 242. Turkey 
underlined the necessity o f the recognition o f all regional states’ right o f survival in 
security, but made a reservation on the first article o f the resolution which defined 
Israel as an aggressor state. In order not to harm its bilateral relations with Israel, 
Turkey refrained from being at the same side with the Arab states on this issue.^^^ But 
after the War o f 1967, Turkey expressed its sympathy towards the Arab states and at 
the same time was able to keep in balance its relations with Israel.
In the determination process o f Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Israel, 
Israel’s actions were assessed. As Israel occupied most o f the Arab lands in the 1967 
war and led the Palestinian conflict to its peak, Turkey voted in favour o f all o f the 
resolutions in the UN in 1967 and made amendments in its relations with Israel and 
the Arab states. Turkey emphasized the unquestionability o f the existence o f Israel 
and on the other hand, because of the need of maintaining international support in 
Cyprus conflict, Turkey had to promote and keep in balance its relations with the 
Arab s t a t e s . S o  after the War o f 1967, Turkey began to establish closer relations 
with the Arab states.
During the war period, Turkey did not let its bases in Adana be used by 
foreign forces. On 5 June 1967, the Turkish Minister o f Foreign Affairs İhsan Sabri 
Çağlayangil declared that “the mihtary bases in Turkey were not going to be used 
against the Arabs by way o f afait-accompli”.^ '^* After the end o f the war, Çağlayangil 
again made a statement and declared that; “Turkey was against territorial gains. . .by
Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yanm, 1997: 88. 
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use of force”.^* Also at the end o f the war, Turkey played an active role in 
humanitarian aid projects and food, clothing and medicine were sent as an aid through 
the Turkish Red Crescent to the Arab States, which were badly affected from the 
outcome o f the war. So the Arab States appreciated the Turkish support and 
following the War o f 1967, therefore Turkey was kept out of the petroleum embargo.
4.2.2. Yom Kippur War (1973)
When Israel refused to return Arab territories, which were occupied during the 
Six-Day War o f 1967, on 6 October 1973 Egypt and Syria decided to launch a joint 
surprise attack on Israeli forces. Syria attacked the Golan Heights and Egypt, the 
Sinai. The Syrians were aided by Jordanian and Iraqi troops and they initially gained 
some land in the north, but by 11 October the situation turned vice versa and Israel 
defeated Syria. On the other hand, in the south the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal 
and penetrated about 10 km into the Israeli-occupied Sinai before they were stalled. 
On 16 October, Israel counterattacked and invaded Egypt and on 22 October a 
ceasefire was arranged by the U.N., which had an important impact on the Syrian 
front and in Egypt after two days. Although Israel militarily won the war, Egypt by 
the initial performance of its army, managed to turn the war into a psychological 
victory. After the end of the war, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was blamed for 
unpreparedness and was forced to resign in the following June. The Yom Kippur
Dışişleri Bakanlığı Bülteni, 1967: 19.
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W ar^’ marked the beginning o f the use o f oil as a weapon in the Middle East 
struggle. From October 1973 till March 1974, the Arab States applied an embargo on 
oil exports to Western nations, which were friendly to Israel. But the embargo was 
not applied to Turkey due to her friendly attitude towards the Arab States during the 
Six-Day War.^^*
During the War o f 1973, the Ambassadors o f Syria and Egypt requested political 
public support from Turkey on 9 October 1973. Then on 10 October, the spokesman 
of the Turkish Ministry o f Foreign Affairs announced that, “Turkey does not approve 
forceful occupation o f Arab territories by Israel and that it feels a lasting peace 
settlement can only be reached upon the satisfaction of the legitimate demands o f the 
Arab nations on this matter” . Also on 14 October, some of the Arab Ambassadors in 
Ankara asked for Turkish humanitarian aid to the regions, which were damaged 
during the war.^^^ On 18 October, Turkey announced to the U.S. government that: 
“the military bases in Turkey can not be used to assist and send logistic support to 
Israel during the current war”. Turkey also did not allow the US to use refueling and 
reconnaissance facilities during the American airlift to Israel and did not let any Soviet 
planes carry arms to the Arab States over the Turkish airspace. On the other hand on 
24 October, the American delegation at NATO claimed that: “The Russians were 
sending arms to the Arab countries over Turkey” .^ “®
During and after the Six Day War and Yom Kippur War, Turkey supported 
the Arab states in the UN votings. On 10 November 1975, Turkey joined in the UN
Yom Kippur War was the fourth armed conflict between Israel and the neighbor Arab States. The 
War is called as Yom Kippur War because the war began on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. 
Also in the Muslim calendar it is called as the Ramadan War.
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General Assembly’s resolution with the Arab States, which defined Zionism as “a 
form o f racism and racial discrimination” '^**
Since the 1970s, Turkey had also developed its relations with the Arab states in 
economic and cultural fields. But the political factors were the main determinants in 
Turkish Arab relations. In 1970s, Turkey began to establish and promote economic 
cooperation with the Gulf States, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, 
Turkish-Arab rapprochement had also political and military impacts. Turkey was also 
interested in developing cooperative military programs with the Arab States, mostly in 
training area. Most o f the programs were performed with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and 
Tunisia. '^*^ On the other hand during this period, Turkey conducted a low-profile 
policy towards Israel.
Turkish-Israeli relations were also influenced by the policies o f the Israel 
government towards the Palestinian issue. From the Turkish perspective, the Arab- 
Israel conflict caused destabilization, radicalization and heavy armament in the region. 
Therefore Turkey considered the solution o f the Palestinian conflict as the unique 
solution in Arab-Israel conflict. In the same period, Turkey had to follow a pro- 
Arab and pro-Palestinian policy due to Turkey’s concern at the effective use of the oil 
weapon by the Middle East members o f OPEC and the commercial opportunities 
opening up in the oil producing countries. In 1976, Turkey became a member o f the 
Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) and after Turkish membership, Turkey began 
to reconsider its foreign policy towards the Middle East. So in this regard, Turkish 
policy towards Israel was fundamental to Turkish-Arab relations. In general, Turkey
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supported the Arabs and in particular, the PLO continued through and beyond the 
bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel.
From the Turkish point o f view, peace in the Middle East can only be 
reestablished when Israel would evacuate the Arab lands which was invaded in 1967 
and when the Palestinians would gain the right of establishing their own state. Turkey 
also emphasized that no lasting settlement can be reached without the participation o f 
the legitimate representative o f the Palestinians in the negotiations. Also the 
settlement o f the Arab- Israeli conflict would eliminate most o f the conditions, which 
would lead to an increase in the Soviet influence in the Middle East. '^** So to sum up, 
on the Palestinian issue Turkey believed that the legitimate right o f the Palestinians, 
which was the right o f estabUshing their own state, should be recognized. In parallel 
with the resolution adopted on 26-27 October 1974 by the Arab Summit held in 
Rabat, Turkey recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the 
“legitimate representative o f the Palestinian people in all liberated Palestinian 
territory” in 1976^“*^ and on August 1979 Turkey let the PLO open an office in 
Ankara.
In the Palestinian conflict, Turkey had a different position from the US and 
Israel. Turkey had rather closer position to the Western European position. From the 
Turkish perspective, the Palestinian conflict was a very important cause o f instability 
in the Middle East. So Turkey supported the establishment o f an independent State o f 
Palestine and considered the PLO as the legitimate representative o f the Palestinians.
^^^Yavuz, 1991: 18. 
^^Gürkan, 1993:104.
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It can be said that if the Arab-Israeli talks would be successful, then Turkey and Israel 
would have more developed relations.^'*’
Despite the US efforts to establish consensus between the parties to the 
conflict, Israel did not recognize the existence o f the PLO, the efforts o f the US 
became unsuccessfiil. On 22 November 1974, the UN recognized the right of “self- 
determination”, national independence and the right o f sovereignty o f the Palestinians 
and then the PLO acquired the observer status at the UN. With the decision of UN, 
the PLO became an independent entity and a legal party in the Middle East Peace 
Talks. After 1974, the PLO had initiatives towards being recognized by international 
entities. In the following years, the efforts o f the US to establish peace continued and 
on 17 September 1978, Camp David Agreement was signed between Egypt and Israel 
in the US. The agreement foresaw to make arrangements in Egypt-Israel relations and 
to settle the Palestinian conflict. According to the agreement, Egypt, Israel, Jordan 
and Palestine would solve the conflict through three leveled negotiations. First level 
was to have elections in Western Sharia and Gazza for an autonomous administration, 
which would replace the Military Administration o f Israel for five years. Second level 
was with the governance o f autonomous administration for five years period would 
begin and the administration would establish its own police organization and the third 
level was after the beginning o f the transition period at most in three years in which 
Egypt, Israel and Jordan would begin negotiations in order to determine the latest 
status o f the Western Sharia and Gazza. So with this agreement a solution for the
247 Karaosmanoglu, 1992:.4-5.
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Palestinian conflict was recommended. But through the negotiations parties could not 
reach any solution.
On 15 November 1988, Independent State o f Palestine was established by 
Yasser Arafat and he declared that they accept the UN Resolution o f 242 and they 
would give up engaging in terrorist activities. He also declared that they recognize the 
existence o f Israel on the Palestinian lands. Even the Palestine did not have sovereign 
lands, the Arab states recognized the State o f Palestine but the existence o f Palestine 
was rejected by Israel. As mentioned above, Turkey was also among the first states to 
recognize Palestine. After these developments, the US began contacts with the PLO, 
but for a long time in peace talks the parties to the conflict did not reach any 
solution.
4.3. Turkish-Israeli Relations up to the 1980s
After the mid-1960s and onward, Turkish- Arab relations and ties began to 
develop especially in political, economic and cultural fields. By the enactment o f the 
"Jerusalem Law" in Israel on 30 July 1980, Israeli Parliament Knesset declared that; 
"Jerusalem (El Kuds) was united and it was to be the permanent capital o f Israel". 
The law proposal was submitted by a member o f Knesset; Guela Cohen, and accepted 
by 69 to 15 against votes with 3 abstentions.^^** At the beginning o f July 1980, before 
the formal enactment o f the law, Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel met the 
ambassadors of the Islamic countries and criticised Israel's actions as being against
Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yannı, 1997: 89-90. 
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international law and justice. On the other hand, the partner of the coalition 
government National Salvation Party also applied pressure to the prime minister to 
react severly against Israel on this event.
The National Salvation Party and Republican People's Party accused Turkish 
Minister o f Foreign Affairs Hayrettin Erkmen o f being pro-Israeli and not reacting 
against Israel. The debate on this subject continued in the Turkish Parliament until 28 
August decision with 230 to 2 votes and with 180 abstentions. H.Erkman was 
withdrawn from his position. This event shows the power and influence o f domestic 
dynamics on Turkish Foreign Policy, especially in relation to Middle East issues. The 
Arab States also applied pressure to Turkey to cut off its relations with Israel. In 
response to both internal and external pressures, Turkey officially considered the 
Israeli Law as a fa it accompli and requested repeal from Israel.
Turkey reacted swiftly against this law, and refijsed to recognize the new 
capital o f Israel and on 28 August 1980, the closure o f the Turkish Consulate General 
in Jerusalem was announced by Turkish Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. In October, 
Turkey began to take further measures by substantially diminishing its diplomatic 
relations with Israel. On 2 December 1980, in order to acquire internal and external 
credibility, Turkish Military regime (military take over that took place on 12 
September 1980) decided to further diminish its relations with Israel and Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that "Turkey decided to limit its relations with 
Israel and mutually reduced the level o f representation" because "Israel would not
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retreat front its insurgent policy regarding the legal status o f Jerusalem". ^^ '^ As the 
military coup faced reactions from the West for violating the democracy, it turned 
towards the Middle East Islamic States to acquire support.
When the decision to close the Turkish General Consulate in Jerusalem was 
taken, reactions against this decision increased in Turkey. Hasan Esat Işık who was 
the former and experienced foreign and defence minister o f Turkey also opposed this 
decision and considered Turkish latest decision as a diplomatic and political mistake. 
According to H.E.Işık, 20 August 1980 UN Security Council Resolution 478 called 
the member states to withdraw their diplomatic missions from Jerusalem. But the 
history of Turkish Consulate in Jerusalem went back to the Ottoman Empire period 
and therefore was not accredited to the Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. So the 
Turkish Consulate in Jerusalem did not have a diplomatic mission and legally there 
was no reason to close the consulate.^** Also Israeli declaration violated the 
resolutions o f the UN Security Council concerning the partition o f Palestine between 
Arabs and Jews on 1947 and foresaw an international status for Jerusalem, a corpus 
seperaium-tyiAsXtnct o f separate entities.
On 14 December 1981 Israel annexed the Golan Heights, which gave rise to 
fierce reactions from the Islamic world. Also the UN Security Council rejected the 
Israeli actions as being against international law. Along with the majority, in order 
to protest Israel’s annexation and occupation o f Arab territories the Golan Heights, 
Turkey protested Israel and downgraded its representation level to Second Secretary, 
but kept its embassy in Tel Aviv. This annexation turned Turkish public opinion
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against Israel and it was defined as an agressor state.^*’ Turkish policy o f calling back 
all o f its diplomats but leaving only the Second Secretary at the embassy was 
considered as "freezing the relations". On the other hand with Israel’s enactment o f 
“Jerusalem Law”, the UN and the US also condemned the action o f Knesset and Latin 
American Catholic countries decided to move their embassies from Jerusalem to Tel 
Aviv.^ *^
During this period it can be said that, cultural relations between Turkey and 
Israel were cut off and commercial relations were downgraded. When Turkey 
downgraded its representation level in Israel at the beginning, in contrast with most of 
the Western States that changed the places o f their embassies to Jerusalem, Turkish 
embassy remained in Tel Aviv. ^^^Turkey also began to criticise Israeli policies at the 
UN and at other international organisations. So the new Turkish Foreign Policy 
towards Israel led to a new period in Turkish-Israeli relations.
Israel began to seek solutions in order to persuade Turkey to change its 
decision o f downgrading relations with Israel by using its connections and Jewish 
lobby in the U S. After a short while, in January 1981, sixty-nine American senators 
sent a letter to the Turkish Embassy in Washington declaring that Turkish recent 
decision might also have negative impacts on Turkish-American relations. The letter 
caused many reactions in Turkey and Turkish Embassy in Tel Aviv indicated its 
reaction by refusing to issue visas to an Israeli sports team. Then, American 
Ambassador in Turkey informed Turkish Government about the possible
Hubei, 1987:110. But according to N.Tavlas; at the UN General Council voting, Turkey abstained 
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consequences o f breaking diplomatic relations with Israel. ^*®Also at the same period 
under the influence o f Jewish and Greek lobbies, the American Congress decided not 
to pay 100 million dollars financial support to Turkey in order to again indicate to 
Turkey the consequences o f its decision. As a result o f the US pressure, on 14 
February 1982 Turkish President Kenan Evren visited Jewish religious leader Davit 
Aseo in Turkey.
Turkish decision to downgrade Turkish-Israeli relations was grounded on two 
reasons which were: the need to maintain Islamic and Arab State’s support in the 
Cyprus issue and the need to provide economic support from the Islamic and Arab 
States. Also according to H. Yavuz, there was a dialectical relation between the Arab 
State’s policies toward Cyprus and Turkey’s position on the PLO’s status. According 
to H. Yavuz the factors that led Turkey to establish closer ties with the Arab States 
were: Turkish need for support in the Cyprus issue, Turkish need o f Arab oil 
resources and Turkish public opinion against Israel, particularly international criticism 
against Israel.^^* When Turkey allowed the PLO to open an office in Ankara in 
October 1979, in the same year Turkish Federated State o f Cyprus acquired the 
observer status at the Organization o f Islamic Countries and a resolution, which 
entitled equal status to Turkish Cypriots as the Greek Cypriots in international 
forums, was established.“  ^As Turkey tried to strengthen its ties with the Arab World, 
in order to maintain support for the Cyprus issue, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister, 
liter Türkmen visited the Arab States. ^^^When Turkey recognized the State of
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Palestine, as the first state in the Western World, Israel expressed its disappointment 
in Turkey.
Turkish recognition o f the PLO and its allowance to them for opening an 
office in Ankara did not mean that the period was with lack o f problems. When Israel 
realized that Turkey was establishing closer ties with the Arab States and losing the 
western support, its MOSSAD offered to assist Turkey to stop the terrorist activities 
o f the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation o f Armenia (ASALA), which had 
assassinated many Turkish diplomats and which was financed by Libya and members 
trained at the Palestinian camps. But in order to avoid harming Turkish-Arab 
relations, Turkey refused the Israeli offer for cooperation. After a while, when Turkey 
was informed by the assistance o f MOSSAD, about Armenian, Kurdish and left 
oriented terrorists which were trained at the PLO camps, then Turkey began to 
cooperate with Israel. Israel kept on providing information to Turkey about the 
actions o f terrorists and during the Lebanon crisis, Israel bombed the ASALA camp 
and killed the leader o f AS ALA. In response to this collaboration, when the
decision o f considering 1982 intervention o f Israel as genocide in U.N. was voted, 
Turkey abstained from voting. Even if that collaboration against PLO had not taken 
place, it was impossible for Turkey to cut its relations with Israel as Turkey was 
acquiring military and financial aid from the US.^^^
One of the reasons o f Turkey’s decision o f downgrading its relations with 
Israel was the suffering o f the Turkish economy from the shortages o f foreign 
currency and oil during 1978 and 1981. After the fall o f Shah in 1978, there was a 
sudden rise in international oil prices, which caused many hardships in Turkish daily
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life. By the end of 1979, import rates were greater than the export rates and the US 
arms embargo and the absence o f economic assistance had a severe pressure on 
Turkey. The US arms embargo was lifted on 26 September 1978, but the first part o f 
the US assistance did not arrive until May 1979. During economic crisis in 1979 and 
in the winter, schools and hospitals were closed due to scarcity in oil imports in 
Turkey. Turkish oil exports decreased, but the cost o f imported oil was 30 percent 
higher than the total value o f Turkish exports. ^  So the 1980 military government o f 
Bülent Ulusu tried to provide enough oil in order to prevent another disastrous winter 
and requested assistance from Saudi Arabia. For a short while, Turkish Minister o f 
Foreign Affairs liter Türkmen announced that Saudi Arabia had positively responded 
to Turkish demand and would provide oil to Turkey. In August 1980, Saudi Arabia 
sent two million tons o f oil with 75 million dollars economic aid. But in return, Saudi 
Arabia applied heavy pressures on Turkey to downgrade its relations with Israel. 
Besides Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya and the OIC Secretarial also applied pressure on 
Turkey to end its relations with Israel.
According to G.Gruen, the Saudi economic aid of 250 million dollars was sent 
to Turkey on 2 December and at the same date, Turkey declared that it would 
downgrade its relations with Israel. After the Turkish declaration, in 1980-1981 
Turkish exports to the Middle East had risen to 40.3 percent o f its total export, in 
contrast with 0.4 percent export rate to Israel and by 1982, Turkish export rate to the 
Middle East increased from 40.3 to 44.2 percent. It can be said that, Turkish leaders
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considered the Middle East Islamic States as economic alternatives to Israel. In 
order to take advantage o f the booming economies of the oil producing states and 
reduce the foreign trade deficit, Turkey expanded economic ties with the Arab and 
Islamic States. The determinants o f Turkish-Israeli relations have varied, as Turkey 
has tried hard to overcome its economic problems and balance its national interests 
between the intensive opposing pressures o f the western and Arab States.
In the middle of the 1980s, Turkish-Israeli trade relations improved and 
Turkish public opinion was also turning in favour o f Israel. On September 1986, Israel 
sent an ambassador to Ankara and upgraded the representation level to charge 
d'affaires. But with the emergence o f Intifada (Palestinian uprising), Turkish policy 
with regard to Israel and Palestine was again reversed. The media showed the brutal 
attacks o f Israeli armed forces to innocent Palestinians. As a result o f these scenes, 
Turkish public opinion turned in favor o f the Palestinians. Therefore in the middle o f 
the 1980s with the emergence of Intifada the relations between Israel and Turkey 
again detonated.^’®
Few years later, with the decline in Arab economic wealth and an increase o f 
anti-secular movements in Turkey, Turkey decided to upgrade its relations with Israel 
by sending a senior experienced Turkish diplomat Ekrem Güvendiren to the head of 
legation in Tel Aviv in September 1986. Although, this diplomat was sent as charge 
d ’affaires, he had an ambassadorial position in Ankara.^’* Then, Israel upgraded its 
relation by appointing Yehudo Milo to Ankara. Î^rom 1986 onward, Turkish-Israeli 
relations again began to improve. In 1988 at the UN voting, Turkey voted against an
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Arab resolution that called for the rejection of Israeli diplomatic credentials at the UN. 
Turkish-Israeli trade increased from 29 million dollars in 1986 to 140 million dollars 
in 1990. The reason behind this development in Turkish-Israeli relations was the 
internal sources o f the US foreign policy and the influence of the Jewish lobby in the 
US Congress, which provided support for Turkey through the strong Jewish lobby 
against the Greek and the Armenian lobbies. Turkey again upgraded its diplomatic 
representation level in Israel to the full ambassadorial position on 19 December 1991 
and at the same date the representation level of the PLO was upgraded to the same 
level. Agreements between Turkey and Israel in the fields of culture, tourism, 
education, technical and science were signed in 1992 and these agreements promoted 
cooperation in Turkish-Israeli relations.^’'* In November 1993, Mutual Commercial 
and Technical Cooperation agreement was signed between Turkey and Israel. In 
1994, collaboration between Israel and Turkey developed more, especially in military, 
economic and security fields. But also, in order to balance its relations in the Middle 
East, Turkey had to continue its relations with the Arab States without neglecting the 
pressure of Western States
In 1995, another agreement was signed between Turkey and Israel, which 
provided opportunities especially for Turkey to use and acquire know-how of the 
modem technological devices and acquiring opportunities of training in the field of 
agriculture. Besides, unlike Iraq and Syria, Israel declared its open support for the
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GAP Project. On March 1996, Free Trade Agreement was signed between Israel and 
Turkey, which increased the mutual trade by 50 percent.
Turkey demanded to establish mutual strategic and intelligence cooperation with 
Israel, especially with regard to PKK On 18 February 1996, military cooperation 
agreement was signed between Turkey and Israel covertly and the agreement was 
based on cooperation in the fields o f strategy and intelligence. But Arab and Islamic 
States reacted to this agreement by proclaiming that this agreement threatened their 
security. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that, this agreement had only 
one aim, which was training and incompliance with this, in the middle o f April, mutual 
training begun in Turkey. By the assistance o f the Israeli intelligence, Turkey was 
informed about the activities o f PKK in Bekaa Valley. Apart from supporting Turkey 
against PKK, Israel also supported Turkey and provided information about 
Hizboullah and Hamas organizations, which were mainly supported by Syria.
In 1996-1997 period, Turkish-Israeli relations reached its peak (especially with the 
1996 Military Agreement) and developments in bilateral relations were directly related 
with the security issue. Within this framework, it can be said that after the Cold War 
period, Turkish national security began to be threatened by the Middle East Arab 
States, especially through the support they gave to terrorist organizations in Turkey. 
After the Cold War, the common threats, which Israel and Turkey faced in the Middle 
East were terrorism, increase in fanatic so called Islamic trends and dissemination of 
the Weapons o f Mass Destruction. Therefore, in order to maintain balance and
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stability in the region, Turkey developed its relations with Israel. There were also 
other conunon factors with Israel, such as being a non-Arab State, being a democratic 
and secular state. The existence o f the U S. and the Western support behind Israel and 
Turkey’s isolation from the Islamic World, led Turkey to establish closer ties with 
Israel. On the other hand, Turkish-Israeli-American cooperation also led to the 
emergence o f counter-alliances, In the period o f 1997-1998, Iraq and Syria began to 
support Radical Islamic groups and Hizboullah, in addition to PKK, which subverted 
against the Turkish government,
279 Aykan, 1999:103-104.
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CONCLUSION
After the establishment o f Israel, the balance o f power changed in the Middle 
East and the Arab-Israeli conflict began. In this context, Turkey had to pursue a 
balancing policy in the region in order to establish peace and stability. During the first 
years of Israel’s establishment, Turkey was rather hesitant towards Israel, because at 
the beginning Israel was neutral and had close relations with the Soviet Union. But 
after Israel persuaded Turkey that it was non-communist, Turkey recognized the State 
of Israel on 9 March 1950 as de jure and became the first Muslim State that 
recognized Israel.
Since the establishment o f the Turkish Republic, Turkey pursued pro-western 
policy. Especially after becoming a NATO member in 1952, Turkish foreign policy 
was even more integrated with the Western States. There was pressure from the 
western allies to support Israel as a regional power. This was the main reason behind 
Turkey’s recognition o f Israel. On the other hand, from Israel’s point o f view, as it 
was surrounded by hostile neighbours, Turkey’s support was indispensable and 
desperately needed. But during this period, Turkey was severely criticised by the Arab 
states for recognising Israel, as the Arab states rejected the establishment of Israel in 
Palestinian territories. Thus, Arab-Israeli conflict began and relations between the 
Arab states and Israel were strained. In Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey preffered to 
remain neutral.
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Turkish-Israeli relations were developing upto 1956. But, when Israel invaded 
the Sinai Peninsula in 1956, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Tel-Aviv and 
downgraded its representation level. With this decision Turkey aimed to calm down 
the reactions o f the Arab states, but Turkish efforts were all invain. So in 1958 Turkey 
and Israel concluded the Peripheral Pact, which led both states to collaborate in the 
fields o f intelligence and military as well as in commerce and science. The pact was 
again denounced by the Arab states as in the past.
In the Cyprus issue o f 1965, Turkey was isolated by NATO members and 
especially by the U S. Therefore Turkey began to reassess its foreign policy towards 
the west. As a result o f this reassessments, Turkey decided to make the necessary 
ammendments in its foreign policy, which were; to become a member and an active 
player o f the O. I. C., increase the economic relations with the Arab States in order to 
acquire financial support, maintain international support for the Cyprus issue and not 
to act always in parallel with the U S. Therefore in the middle o f 1960s, Turkey and 
the Arab States became closer and in order to acquire Arab economic and poUtical 
support for Turkish Cypriots in 1969, Turkey joined the O.I.C as an observer. But as 
Turkey and the Arab states could not reach a consensus and eliminate the differences 
between them, the expected outcome could not be achieved. During the Cyprus issue 
in the beginning, Israel remained neutral but had a dominant pro-Turkish status in its 
policies. Then after Turkey’s request for Israeli assistance, Israel promised to support 
Turkey through its press, lobby and loans. Despite this collaboration between Turkey 
and Israel, Turkey tried to keep its relations with Israel in secrecy in order not to lose 
the Arab support.
I l l
After the middle of 1960s, Turkish-Arab relations began to develop especially 
in the fields of economy, politics and culture. When Israeli Parliament Knesset 
declared Jerusalem as Israel’s permanent capital on 30 July 1980, by the enactment of 
Jerusalem Law, Turkey refused to recognize the new capital o f Israel. On 28 August 
1980, Turkish Consulate General in Jerusalem was closed. On 14 December 1981, 
Israel annexed the Golan Heights and Turkey with the Islamic states and the U.N. 
Security Council rejected Israeli action as being against the international law. Then, 
Turkey downgraded its representation to the level o f the Second Secretary, but kept 
its embassy in Tel Aviv. Besides, genuenly considering Israel’s action as against the 
international law, the other reasons behind Turkey’s action was to maintain Islamic 
support in the Cyprus issue and the necessity to provide economic support from the 
Islamic states.
In response to MOSSAD’s offer for assisstance and collaboration to end the 
terrorist activities of the ASALA and to follow Armenian, Kurdish and left oriented 
terrorists, which were trained at the PLO camps, Turkey decided to cooperate with 
Israel. On September 1986, Israel sent an ambassador to Ankara and upgraded the 
representation level to charge d'affaires and with the decline in Arab economic 
wealth and an increase o f anti-secular movements in Turkey, Turkey decided to 
upgrade its relations with Israel by sending a diplomat to Tel-Aviv on September 
1986. Although the Turkish diplomat was sent as charge d ’affaires, he had an 
ambassadorial position in Ankara. From 1986 onward, Turkish-Israeli relations again 
began to develop. On 19 December 1991, Turkey upgraded its diplomatic
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representation level in Israel to the full ambassadorial level. In the years 1993 and 
1995, agreements were concluded between Turkey and Israel in the fields o f 
technology, commerce and agriculture. On 18 February 1996 as a result o f the 
Turkish demand for establishing a mutual strategic and intelligence cooperation with 
Israel, with regard to PKK, the military cooperation agreement was signed between 
Turkey and Israel in secrecy and with this agreement as both states collaborated 
against PKK, Hizboullah and Hamas, Turkish-Israeli relations reached its peak. But 
the Arab states condemned this collaboration.
In spite o f its ups and downs, Turkish relations with Israel continued without 
any cessations. Relations were never cut off. But, Turkey preferred to pursue its 
Israeli policy covertly in order not to lose the support o f the Arab States. While it 
maintained its collaboration with Israel on defence, intelligence and security issues. 
During 1948-1980, Turkish Israeli relations developed mostly in the fields of defence, 
economy, agriculture, education and culture. So it can be said that diplomatic 
relations with Israel began to develop after the 1990s. Therefore, during the analysis 
o f the period between 1948-1980, while the relations were established mostly in 
secrecy, overt evidences o f it were very scarce.
Isolation of Israel in the region by the Arab States forced Israel to seek an ally 
in the Middle East in order to safeguard its security and Turkey was the most possible 
ally. As both states had more common factors when compared to other states in the 
region, such as being a democratic and secular state, being non-Arab and pursuing 
west-oriented policies as well as being supported by the U.S. and the other Western 
States The good relations were considered to be beneficial for each state in order to
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maintain stability in the Middle East. But beside these developments during 
1948-1980, Turkey also tried to keep good relations with the Arab States, for 
example Turkey recognized the PLO as the first western state and became a member 
of the O.I.C. In conformity with Turkey’s historical experience with both the Arab 
States and Israel (with Jews), Turkey always tried to keep in balance its relations with 
these Middle East powers, but according to the domestic or international 
circumstances, sometimes more preponderence was given to one side.
After the conclusion o f the Defence Industrial Cooperation Agreement 
between Turkey and Israel, relations flourished rapidly. Current close relations with 
Israel can be focused around four fundamental topics such as-water issue; prospective 
Israeli (agricultural) investments at GAP. Cooperation in defence and modernization, 
the process o f Middle East peace and stability, and solution o f the Palestine problem, 
especially after the Camp David talks. Some observers think Turkey could take a 
more active role in seeking solutions and could mediate between Palestine and Israel. 
Recent frequent visits o f Israel and Turkish statemen to Turkey and Israel also give 
indication o f a more intense relations between the two countries in future.
This study shows that Turkish-Israeli relations were pursued under the 
shadow o f Arab states although, Turkish-Israeli close ties were considered by the 
U.S. as one o f the important factors o f keeping peace and stability in the Middle East, 
they could not be openly declared and developed during the period under the scrutiny 
in this study.
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UN General Assembly Resolution 181 
(Partition Plan)
November 29, 1947
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 called for 
the partition of the British-ruled Palestine Mandate into 
a Jewish state and an Arab state. It was approved on 
November 29, 1947 with 33 votes in favor, 13 against, 10 
abstentions and one absent (see list at end of document).
The resolution was accepted by the Jews in Palestine, yet 
rejected by the Arabs in Palestine and the Arab states.
Text:
The General Assembly,
Having met in special session at the request of the 
mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a Special 
Committee to prepare for the consideration of the 
question of the future Government of Palestine at the 
second regular session;
Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it 
to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the 
problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the 
solution of the problem, and
Having received and examined the report of the Special 
Committee (document A/364)(1) including a number of 
unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with 
economic union approved by the majority of the Special 
Committee,
Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one 
which is likely to impair the general welfare and 
friendly relations among nations;
Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that 
it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 
August 1948;
Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power 
for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United 
Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to 
the future Government of Palestine, of the Plan of 
Partition with Economic Union set out below;
Requests that
The Security Council take the necessary measures as 
provided for in the plan for its implementation;
The Security Council consider, if circumstances during 
the transitional period require such consideration, 
whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat 
to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, 
and in order to maintain international peace and 
security, the Security Council should supplement the 
authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, 
under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the 
United Nations Commission, as provided in this 
resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which 
are assigned to it by this resolution;
The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance 
with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by 
force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;
The Trusteeship Council be informed of the 
responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such 
steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan 
into effect;
Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain 
from taking any action which might hamper or delay the 
carrying out of these recommendations, and
Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and 
subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission 
referred to in Part 1, Section B, Paragraph I below, on 
such basis and in such forra as he may determine most 
appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the 
Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying 
out the functions assigned to the Commission by the 
General Assembly.*
The General Assembly,
Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working 
Capital Fund a sum not to exceed 2,000,000 dollars for 
the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the 
resolution on the future government of Palestine.
PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION
Part I. - Future Constitution and Government of Palestine
A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE
The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as 
possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be 
progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to 
be completed as soon as possible but in any case not 
later than 1 August 1948.
The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far 
in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the 
mandate and to evacuate each area. The mandatory Power 
shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area 
situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including 
a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities 
for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the 
earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 
February 1948.
Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special 
International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth 
in Part III of this Plan, shall come into existence in 
Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed 
forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in 
any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of 
the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of 
Jerusalem shall be as described in Parts II and III 
below.
The period between the adoption by the General Assembly 
of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and 
the establishment of the independence of the Arab and 
Jewish States shall be a transitional period.
B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE
A Commission shall be set up consisting of one 
representative of each of five Member States. The Members 
represented on the Commission shall be elected by the 
General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and 
otherwise, as possible.
The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory 
Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned 
over to the Commission, which shall act in conformity 
with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under
the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power 
shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans 
for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take 
over and administer areas which have been evacuated.
In the discharge of this administrative responsibility 
the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary 
regulations and take other measures as required.
The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, 
obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of 
the measures recommended by the General Assembly.
On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed 
to carry out measures for the establishment of the 
frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of 
Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the 
recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition 
of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described 
in Part II of this Plan are to be modified in such a way 
that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state 
boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.
The Commission, after consultation with the democratic 
parties and other public organizations of the Arab and 
Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State 
as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of 
Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish 
Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out 
under the general direction of the Commission.
If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government 
cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if 
selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission 
shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for 
such action with respect to that State as the Security 
Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for 
communication to the Members of the United Nations.
Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, 
during the transitional period the Provisional Councils 
of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have 
full authority in the areas under their control including 
authority over matters of immigration and land 
regulation.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State, 
acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive 
from the Commission full responsibility for the 
administration of that State in the period between the 
termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the 
State's independence.
The Coramission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of 
Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after 
their formation, to proceed to the establishment of 
administrative organs of government, central and local.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State 
shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an 
armed militia from the residents of that State, 
sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to 
prevent frontier clashes.
This armed militia in each State shall, for operational 
purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers 
resident in that State, but general political and 
military control, including the choice of the militia's 
High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State 
shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of 
the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections 
to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on 
democratic lines.
The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up 
by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by 
the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this 
election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who 
are (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State; and 
(b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not 
Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a 
notice of intention to become citizens of such State. 
Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have 
signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the 
Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, 
shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States 
respectively.
Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent 
Assemblies.
During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted 
to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab 
State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish 
residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, 
except by special leave of the Commission.
The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a 
democratic constitution for its State and choose a 
provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council 
of Government appointed by the Commission. The 
Constitutions of the States shall embody Chapters 1 and 2 
of the Declaration provided for in section C below and 
include, inter alia, provisions for:
Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by 
universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of 
proportional representation, and an executive body 
responsible to the legislature;
Settling all international disputes in which the State 
may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered;
Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its 
international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations; 
Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatofy 
rights in civil, political, economic and religious 
matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech 
and publication, education, assembly and association; 
Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents 
and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City 
of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national 
security, provided that each State shall control 
residence within its borders.
The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic 
commission of three members to make whatever arrangements 
are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to 
establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union 
and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D 
below.
During the period between the adoption of the 
recommendations on the question of Palestine by the 
General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the 
mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full 
responsibility for administration in areas from which it 
has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall 
assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these 
functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate 
with the Commission in the execution of its functions.
With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in 
the functioning of administrative services and that, on 
the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory 
Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of 
the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, 
respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be 
a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the 
Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of 
government, including that of maintaining law and order
in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power 
have been withdrawn.
The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the 
recommendations of the General Assembly and by such 
instructions as the Security Council may consider 
necessary to issue.
The measures taken by the Commission, within the 
recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become 
immediately effective unless the Commission has 
previously received contrary instructions from the 
Security Council.
The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress 
reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security 
Council.
The Commission shall make its final report to the next 
regular session of the General Assembly and to the 
Security Council simultaneously.
C. DECLARATION
A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the 
Provisional Government of each proposed State before 
independence. It shall contain, inter alia, the following 
clauses:
General Provision
The stipulations contained in the Declaration are 
recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, 
regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere 
with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or 
official action prevail over them.
Chapter I: Holy Places, Religious Buildings and Sites 
Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious 
buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of 
access, visit, and transit shall be guaranteed, in 
conformity with existing rights, to all residents and 
citizen of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, 
as well as to aliens, without distinction as to 
nationality, subject to requirements of national 
security, public order and decorum.
Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in 
conformity with existing rights, subject to the 
maintenance of public order and decorum.
Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be 
preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in an way 
impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears 
to the Government that any particular Holy Place, 
religious, building or site is in need of urgent repair, 
the Government may call upon the community or communities 
concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may 
carry it out itself at the expense of the community or 
community concerned if no action is taken within a 
reasonable time.
No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, 
religious building or site which was exempt from taxation 
on the date of the creation of the State.
No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made 
which would either discriminate between the owners or 
occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, 
or would place such owners or occupiers in a position 
less favourable in relation to the general incidence of 
taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the 
Assembly's recommendations.
The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the 
right to determine whether the provisions of the 
Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, 
religious buildings and sites within the borders of the 
State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are 
being properly applied and respected, and to make 
decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of 
disputes which may arise between the different religious 
communities or the rites of a religious community with 
respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall 
receive full co-operation and such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his 
functions in the State.
Chapter 2: Religious and Minority Rights
Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms 
of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public 
order and morals, shall be ensured to all.
No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the 
inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or 
sex.
All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be 
entitled to equal protection of the laws.
The family law and personal status of the various 
minorities and their religious interests, including 
endowments, shall be respected.
Except as may be required for the maintenance of public 
order and good government, no measure shall be taken to 
obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or 
charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate 
against any representative or member of these bodies on 
the ground of his religion or nationality.
The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary 
education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, 
in its own language and its cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools 
for the education of its own members in its own language, 
while conforming to such educational requirements of a 
general nature as the State may impose, shall not be 
denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments 
shall continue their activity on the basis of their 
existing rights.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any 
citizen of the State of any language in private 
intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in 
publications of any kind, or at public meetings.(3)
No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish 
State (by a Jew in the Arab State)(4) shall be allowed 
except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation 
full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be 
said previous to dispossession.
Chapter 3: Citizenship, International Conventions and 
Financial Obligations
1. Citizenship
Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the 
City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not 
holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine 
outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition 
of independence, become citizens of the State in which 
they are resident and enjoy full civil and political 
rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, 
within one year from the date of recognition of 
independence of the State in which they reside, for 
citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab 
residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall 
have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed 
Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish 
State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the 
proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option
will be taken to include the wives and children under 
eighteen years of age of persons so opting.
Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State 
and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State 
who have signed a notice of intention to opt for 
citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote 
in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that 
State, but not in the elections to the Constituent 
Assembly of the State in which they reside.
2. International conventions
The State shall be bound by all the international 
agreements and conventions, both general and special, to 
which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right 
of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and 
conventions shall be respected by the State throughout 
the period for which they were concluded.
Any dispute about the applicability and continued 
validity of international conventions or treaties signed 
or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of 
Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of 
Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute 
of the Court.
3. Financial obligations
The State shall respect and fulfil all financial 
obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of 
Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of 
the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision 
includes the right of public servants to pensions, 
compensation or gratuities.
These obligations shall be fulfilled through 
participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of 
those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and 
individually in respect of those applicable to, and 
fairly apportionable between, the States.
A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic 
Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United 
Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one 
representative of the State concerned, should be 
established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and 
the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter 
should be referred to that Court.
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Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of 
Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the 
General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to 
their terms, unless modified by agreement between the 
concession-holders and the State.
Chapter 4: Miscellaneous Provisions
The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration 
shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and 
no modifications shall be made in them without the assent 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member 
of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to 
the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or 
danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and 
the General Assembly may thereupon make such 
recommendations as it may deem proper in the 
circumstances.
Any dispute relating to the application or interpretation 
of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of 
either party, to the International Court of Justice, 
unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.
D, ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT
The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall 
enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union 
and Transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the 
Commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, 
utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and 
cooperation of representative organizations and bodies 
from each of the proposed States. It shall contain 
provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine 
and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 
April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have 
not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall 
be put into force by the Commission.
The Economic Union of Palestine
The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall 
be:
A customs union;
A joint currency system providing for a single foreign 
exchange rate;
Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory 
basis of railways inter-State highways; postal, telephone 
and telegraphic services and ports and airports involved 
in international trade and commerce;
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Joint economic development, especially in respect of 
irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;
Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a 
non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.
There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which 
shall consist of three representatives of each of the two 
States and three foreign members appointed by the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The 
foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance 
for a term of three years; they shall serve as 
individuals and not as representatives of States.
The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to 
implement either directly or by delegation the measures 
necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic 
Union. It shall have all powers of organization and 
administration necessary to fulfil its functions.
The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the 
decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's 
decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.
In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary 
action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to 
withhold an appropriate portion of the part of the 
customs revenue to which the State in question is 
entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State 
persist in its failure to cooperate, the Board may decide 
by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, 
including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as 
it may deem appropriate.
In relation to economic development, the functions of the 
Board shall be planning, investigation and encouragement 
of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake 
such projects except with the assent of both States and 
the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is 
directly involved in the development project.
In regard to the joint currency system, the currencies 
circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem 
shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic 
Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and 
which shall determine the reserves to be held against 
such currencies.
So far as is consistent with paragraph 2 (b) above, each 
State may operate its own central bank, control its own 
fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts 
and expenditures, the grant of import licences, and may 
conduct international financial operations on its own
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faith and credit. During the first two years after the 
termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board 
shall have the authority to take such measures as may be 
necessary to ensure that - to the extent that the total 
foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the 
export of goods and services permit, and provided that 
each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own 
foreign exchange resources - each State shall have 
available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange 
sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported 
goods and services for consumption in its territory 
equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services 
consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period 
ending 31 December 1947.
All economic authority not specifically vested in the 
Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.
There shall be a common customs tariff with complete 
freedom of trade between the States, and between the 
States and the City of Jerusalem.
The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff 
Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the 
States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the 
Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In 
case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint 
Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. 
In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up 
any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic 
Board shall determine the tariff schedule.
The following items shall be a first charge on the 
customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic 
Board :
The expenses of the customs service and of the operation 
of the joint services;
The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board; 
The financial obligations of the Administration of 
Palestine, consisting of:
The service of the outstanding public debt;
The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or 
falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules 
and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 
above.
After these obligations have been met in full, the 
surplus revenue from the customs and other common 
services shall be divided in the following manner: not 
less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the
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City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each 
State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the 
objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level 
of government and social services in each State, except 
that the share of either State shall not exceed the 
amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of 
the Economic Union by more than approximately four 
million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be 
adjusted by the Board according to the price level in 
relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the 
establishment of the Union. After five years, the 
principles of the distribution of the joint revenue may 
be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of 
equity.
All international conventions and treaties affecting 
customs tariff rates, and those communications services 
under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall 
be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two 
States shall be bound to act in accordance with the 
majority of the Joint Economic Board.
The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for 
Palestine's exports fair and equal access to world 
markets.
All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board 
shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.
Freedom of Transit and Visit
The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving 
freedom of transit and visit for all residents or 
citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, 
subject to security considerations; provided that each 
State and the City shall control residence within its 
borders.
Termination, Modification and Interpretation of the 
Undertaking
The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall 
remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall 
continue in force until notice of termination, to take 
effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the 
parties.
During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and 
any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except 
by consent of both parties and with the approval of the 
General Assembly.
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Any dispute relating to the application or the 
interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing 
therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either 
party, to the International Court Of Justice, unless the 
parties agree to another mode of settlement.
E. ASSETS
The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine 
shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the 
City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations 
should be made by the United Nations Commission referred 
to iii section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets 
shall become the property of the government of the 
territory in which they are situated.
During the period between the appointment of the United 
Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, 
the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary 
operations, consult with the Commission on any measure 
which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, 
disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine 
Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the 
proceeds of Government bond issues. State lands or any 
other asset.
F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS
When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish 
State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and 
the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this 
plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic 
consideration should be given to its application for 
admission to membership in the United Nations in 
accordance with article 4 of the Charter of the United 
Nations.
Part II. - Boundaries 
A. THE ARAB STATE
The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded 
on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the 
frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point 
north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds 
southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the 
Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this 
village. There it follows the western boundary line of 
the villages of 'Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence 
following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to 
join the Acre-Safad Sub-District boundary line. It 
follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu'i village
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and joins it again at the northernmost point of 
Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary 
line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows 
the western boundary of Kafr-I'nan village until it 
reaches the Tiberias-Acre Sub-District boundary line, 
passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and 
Lubiya-Kafr-I'nan roads. From the south-west corner of 
Kafr-I'nan village the boundary line follows the western 
boundary of the Tiberias Sub-District to a point close to 
the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and 
'Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as 
much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is 
necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency 
for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.
The boundary rejoins the Tiberias Sub-District boundary 
at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of 
the built-up area of Tur'an; thence it runs southwards, 
at first following the sub-district boundary and then 
passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and 
Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount 
Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the 
horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the 
village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the 
northwest corner of these lands, whence it turns south 
and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources 
of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching 
Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western 
boundaries of the lands of this village to their south­
west comer, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a 
point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between 
the villages of Sarid and El-Mujeidil. This is the point 
of intersection. The south-western boundary of the area 
of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this 
point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of 
Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, 
proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a 
central point on the southern boundary of the village of 
'Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to 
the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and 
north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north­
eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards 
across the village lands of Shafa 'Amr to the 
southeastern corner of Ramat Yohanan. From here it runs 
due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amr-Haifa 
road, west of its junction with the road of I'billin.
From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the 
southern boundary of I'billin situated to the west of the 
I'billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its 
westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows 
across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost
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corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it 
reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along 
the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee- 
Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that 
boundary to the sea.
The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea 
starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east 
of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho 
road and then follows the western side of that road in a 
north-westerly direction to the junction of the 
boundaries of the Sub-Districts of Beisan, Nablus, and 
Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub- 
District boundary westwards for a distance of about three 
kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the 
east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and 
Fagqu'a, to the boundary of the Sub-Districts of Jenin 
and Beisan at a point northeast of Nuris. Thence it 
proceeds first northwestwards to a point due north of the 
built-up area of Zie'in and then westwards to the Afula- 
Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the District 
boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz 
railway. From here the boundary runs southwestwards, 
including the built-up area and some of the land of the 
village of Kh. Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa- 
Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between 
Haifa and Samaria west of El- Mansi. It follows this 
boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El- 
Buteimat. From here it follows the northern and eastern 
boundaries of the village of Ar'ara rejoining the Haifa- 
Samaria district boundary at Wadi 'Ara, and thence 
proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately 
straight line joining up with the western boundary of 
Qagun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern 
boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the 
railway line some distance to the east of it to a point 
just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the 
boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and 
the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras El-Ein road to a 
point just east of Ras El-Ein station, whence it proceeds 
along the railway some distance to the east of it to the 
point on the railway line south of the junction of the 
Haifa-Lydda and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds 
along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south­
west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a 
point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand El 
'Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of 
the built-up area of Abu El-Fadil to the north-east 
corner of the lands of Beer Ya'aqov. (The boundary line 
should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from 
the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line
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follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramie 
village, to the north-east corner of El Na'ana village, 
thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El 
Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and 
the southern boundary of 'Innaba village. Thence it turns 
north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem 
road until El-Qubab, whence it follows the road to the 
boundary of Abu-Shusha. It runs along the eastern 
boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the 
southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a 
straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, 
thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, 
Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of 
Mukhezin to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs 
across the village lands of El-Mismiya El-Kabira, and 
Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is 
midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani 
Sharqi.
From the southern point of intersection the boundary 
lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan 
Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between 
Nabi Yunis and Minat El-Qila, and south-eastwards to a 
point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south­
westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up 
areas of Es Sawafir Esh Sharqiya and 'Ibdis. From the 
south-east corner of 'Ibdis village it runs to a point 
southwest of the built-up area of Beit 'Affa, crossing 
the Hebron-El-Majdal road just to the west of the built- 
up area of 'Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southward 
along the western village boundary of El-Faluja to the 
Beersheba Sub-District boundary. It then runs across the 
tribal lands of 'Arab El-Jubarat to a point on the 
boundary between the Sub-Districts of Beersheba and 
Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a 
south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza 
main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town.
It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a 
point situated one kilometer to the west of it. From here 
it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and 
along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one 
kilometer, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a 
straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron 
Sub-District boundary. It then follows the Beersheba- 
Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez- 
Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the 
base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 
and 160.
About five kilometres north-east of Ras Ez-Zuweira it 
turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along
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the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres 
in depth, as far as 'Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east 
to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.
The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal 
plain runs from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi 
Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne 
and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it 
turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani 
Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit 
Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up 
areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far 
as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit-Tima.
Thence it runs east of El-Jiya across the village lands 
of El-Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the 
villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the 
south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the 
lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am 
to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit 
Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the 
parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two 
kilometres, turning again in a southwesterly direction 
and continuing in an almost straight line to the north­
west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza'a. From 
there it follows the boundary line of this village to its 
southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction 
along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the 
horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to 
Kh. El-Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction 
to a point known as El-Baha, beyond which it crosses the 
Beersheba-EI 'Auja main road to the west of Kh. El- 
Mushrifa. From there it joins Wadi El-Zaiyatin just to 
the west of El-Subeita. From there it turns to the north­
east and then to the south-east following this Wadi and 
passes to the east of 'Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then 
bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi 'Ajrim 
and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses 
the Egyptian frontier.
The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that 
part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the 
west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to 
the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its 
junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west 
of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south­
east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Yisrael 
lands, to the northwest of Holon local council area, to 
the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of 
Holon with the northeast corner of Bat Yam local council 
area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The 
question of Karton quarter will be decided by the
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Boundary Coinmission, bearing in mind among other 
considerations the desirability of including the smallest 
possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest 
possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish 
State.
B. THE JEWISH STATE
The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern 
Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese 
frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and 
Trans-jordan. It includes the whole of the Huleh Basin, 
Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan Sub-District, the 
boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa 
mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State 
extends north-west, following the boundary described in 
respect of the Arab State. The Jewish section of the 
coastal plain extends from a point between Minat El-Qila 
and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza Sub-District and includes the 
towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave 
of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish 
State follows the boundary described in respect of the 
Arab State.
The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba 
Sub-District, including the Negeb and the eastern part of 
the Gaza Sub-District, but excluding the town of 
Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the 
Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the 
Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron Sub- 
District boundary line to 'Ein Geddi, as described in 
respect of the Arab State.
C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM
The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in 
the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part 
III, section B, below).
Part III. - City of Jerusalem(5)
A. SPECIAL REGIME
The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus 
separatum under a special international regime and shall 
be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship 
Council shall be designated to discharge the 
responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf 
of the United Nations.
B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY
20
The City of Jerusalem shall include the present 
municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages 
and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; 
the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, 'Ein 
Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and 
the most northern Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached 
sketch-map (annex B).
C. STATUTE OF THE CITY
The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the 
approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a 
detailed statute of the City which shall contain, inter 
alia, the substance of the following provisions:
Government machinery; special objectives. The 
Administering Authority in discharging its administrative 
obligations shall pursue the following special 
objectives ;
To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and 
religious interests located in the city of the three 
great monotheistic faiths throughout the world,
Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that 
order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in 
Jerusalem;
To foster cooperation among all the inhabitants of the 
city in their own interests as well as in order to 
encourage and support the peaceful development of the 
mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples 
throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well­
being and any constructive measures of development of the 
residents having regard to the special circumstances and 
customs of the various peoples and communities.
Governor and Administrative staff. A Governor of the City 
of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship 
Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be 
selected on the basis of special qualifications and 
without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be 
a citizen of either State in Palestine.
The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the 
City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of 
administration, including the conduct of external 
affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff 
classed as international officers in the meaning of 
Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever 
practicable from the residents of the city and of the 
rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A
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detailed plan for the organization of the administration 
of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the 
Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.
3. Local autonomy
The existing local autonomous units in the territory of 
the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall 
enjoy wide powers of local government and administration. 
The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration 
and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the 
establishment of special town units consisting, 
respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new 
Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part 
the present municipality of Jerusalem.
Security measures
The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; neutrality 
shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military 
formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted 
within its borders.
Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be 
seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-cooperation 
or interference of one or more sections of the population 
the Governor shall have authority to take such measures 
as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning 
of administration.
To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order, 
especially for the protection of the Holy Places and 
religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor 
shall organize a special police force of adequate 
strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside 
of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct 
such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of this force.
Legislative Organization.
A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the 
city irrespective of nationality on the basis of 
universal and secret suffrage and proportional 
representation, shall have powers of legislation and 
taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, 
conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be 
set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, 
regulation, or official action prevail over them. The 
Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing 
bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the 
preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to 
promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails
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to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal 
functioning of the administration.
Administration of Justice.
The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an 
independent judiciary system, including a court of 
appeal. All the inhabitants of the city shall be subject 
to it.
Economic Union and Economic Regime.
The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic 
Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of 
the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as 
well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The 
headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established 
in the territory City. The Statute shall provide for the 
regulation of economic matters not falling within the 
regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal 
treatment and non-discrimination for all members of the 
United Nations and their nationals.
Freedom of Transit and Visit: Control of residents. 
Subject to considerations of security, and of economic 
welfare as determined by the Governor under the 
directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry 
into, and residence within the borders of the City shall 
be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab 
and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence 
within, the borders of the city for nationals of other 
States shall be controlled by the Governor under the 
directions of the Trusteeship Council.
Relations with Arab and Jewish States. Representatives of 
the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the 
Governor of the City and charged with the protection of 
the interests of their States and nationals in connection 
with the international administration of the City.
Official languages.
Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the 
city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more 
additional working languages, as may be required.
Citizenship.
All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the 
City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the 
State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or 
Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens 
of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to 
Part 1, section B, paragraph 9, of this Plan.
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The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for 
consular protection of the citizens of the City outside 
its territory.
Freedoms of citizens
Subject only to the requirements of public order and 
morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, 
language, education, speech and press, assembly and 
association, and petition.
No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the 
inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or 
sex.
All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal 
protection of the laws.
The family law and personal status of the various persons 
and communities and their religious interests, including 
endowments, shall be respected.
Except as may be required for the maintenance of public 
order and good government, no measure shall be taken to 
obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or 
charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate 
against any representative or member of these bodies on 
the ground of his religion or nationality.
The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary 
education for the Arab and Jewish communities 
respectively, in their own languages and in accordance 
with their cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools 
for the education of its own members in its own language, 
while conforming to such educational requirements of a 
general nature as the City may impose, shall not be 
denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments 
shall continue their activity on the basis of their 
existing rights.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any 
inhabitant of the City of any language in private 
intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in 
publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
Holy Places
Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious 
buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or 
sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured 
in conformity with existing rights and subject to the 
requirements of public order and decorum.
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Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be 
preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way 
impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears 
to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious 
building or site is in need of urgent repair, the 
Governor may call upon the community or communities 
concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may 
carry it out himself at the expense of the community or 
communities concerned if no action is taken within a 
reasonable time.
No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, 
religious building or site which was exempt from taxation 
on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the 
incidence of such taxation shall be made which would 
either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of 
Holy Places, religious buildings or sites or would place 
such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in 
relation to the general incidence of taxation than 
existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's 
recommendations.
Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy 
Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in 
any part of Palestine.
The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings 
and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a 
special concern of the Governor.
With relation to such places, buildings and sites in 
Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, 
on the ground of powers granted to him by the 
Constitution of both States, whether the provisions of 
the Constitution of the Arab and Jewish States in 
Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights 
appertaining thereto are being properly applied and 
respected.
The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on 
the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which 
may arise between the different religious communities or 
the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy 
Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of 
Palestine.
In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council 
of representatives of different denominations acting in 
an advisory capacity.
D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME
The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council the 
aforementioned principles shall come into force not later 
than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the 
first instance for a period of ten years, unless the
25
Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re­
examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After 
the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be 
subject to examination by the Trusteeship Council in the 
light of experience acquired with its functioning. The 
residents the City shall be then free to express by means 
of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications 
of regime of the City.
Part IV. Capitulations
States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in 
Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, 
including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and 
protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage 
in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right 
pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such 
privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish 
States and the City of Jerusalem.
Adopted at the 128th plenary meeting:
In favour: 33
Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian S.S.R., 
Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, 
Liberia, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Sweden, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of South Africa, U.S.A., 
U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Venezuela.
Against: 13
Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen.
Abstained: 10
Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.
(1) See Official Records of the General Assembly, Second 
Session Supplement No. 11,Volumes 1-lV.
* At its hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting on 29 
November 1947 the General Assembly, in accordance with 
the terms of the above resolution, elected the following
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members of the United Nations Commission on Palestine: 
Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and 
Philippines.
(2) This resolution was adopted without reference to a 
Committee.
(3) The following stipulation shall be added to the 
declaration concerning the Jewish State: "In the Jewish 
State adequate facilities shall be given to Arabic­
speaking citizens for the use of their language, either 
orally or in writing, in the legislature, before the 
Courts and in the administration."
(4) In the declaration concerning the Arab State, the 
words "by an Arab in the Jewish State" should be replaced 
by the words "by a Jew in the Arab State."
(5) On the question of the internationalization of 
Jerusalem, see also General Assembly resolutions 185 (S- 
2) of 26 April 1948; 187 (S-2) of 6 May 1948, 303 (IV) of 
9 December 1949, and resolutions of the Trusteeship 
Council (Section IV).
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